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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
TIME-DELAY SWITCH ATTACK ON NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS 
EFFECTS AND COUNTERMEASURES 
by 
Arman Sargolzaei 
Florida International University, 2015 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Kang K. Yen, Major Professor 
In recent years, the security of networked control systems (NCSs) has been an important 
challenge for many researchers. Although the security schemes for networked control 
systems have advanced in the past several years, there have been many acknowledged 
cyber attacks. As a result, this dissertation proposes the use of a novel time-delay switch 
(TDS) attack by introducing time delays into the dynamics of NCSs.  Such an attack has 
devastating effects on NCSs if prevention techniques and countermeasures are not 
considered in the design of these systems. To overcome the stability issue caused by TDS 
attacks, this dissertation proposes a new detector to track TDS attacks in real time. This 
method relies on an estimator that will estimate and track time delays introduced by a 
hacker. Once a detector obtains the maximum tolerable time delay of a plant’s optimal 
controller (for which the plant remains secure and stable), it issues an alarm signal and 
directs the system to its alarm state. In the alarm state, the plant operates under the 
control of an emergency controller that can be local or networked to the plant and 
remains in this stable mode until the networked control system state is restored.  
 vii 
 
In another effort, this dissertation evaluates different control methods to find out which 
one is more stable when under a TDS attack than others.  Also, a novel, simple and 
effective controller is proposed to thwart TDS attacks on the sensing loop (SL). The 
modified controller controls the system under a TDS attack. Also, the time-delay 
estimator will track time delays introduced by a hacker using a modified model 
reference-based control with an indirect supervisor and a modified least mean square 
(LMS) minimization technique.   
Furthermore, here, the demonstration proves that the cryptographic solutions are 
ineffective in the recovery from TDS attacks. A cryptography-free TDS recovery (CF-
TDSR) communication protocol enhancement is introduced to leverage the adaptive 
channel redundancy techniques, along with a novel state estimator to detect and assist in 
the recovery of the destabilizing effects of TDS attacks.  The conclusion shows how the 
CF-TDSR ensures the control stability of linear time invariant systems.  
  
 viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER             PAGE 
 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1 
1.1 General Statement of Problem Area ................................................................... 1 
1.2 Problem Statement and Research Questions ....................................................... 4 
1.3 Dissertation Roadmap ......................................................................................... 5 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND DESIGN FUNDAMENTALS .................. 8 
2.1 Networked Control Systems ............................................................................... 8 
2.2 Challenges for Networked Control Systems ....................................................... 9 
2.3 Time-Delay Estimation ..................................................................................... 11 
2.4 Different Types of Attacks on NCS .................................................................. 12 
CHAPTER 3 NATURAL TIME DELAY IN CONTROL SYSTEMS, EFFECTS 
AND SOLUTIONS ........................................................................................................... 19 
3.1 Time-Delay Effects on a Three-Phase Current Source Boost Inverter ............. 19 
3.1.1 Switching Pattern and Control of CSBI .................................................... 20 
3.1.2 Practical Control with Time Delay and Solution ...................................... 25 
3.1.3  Simulation and Experimental Results ....................................................... 28 
3.2 Optimal Control Problem with Time-Delay ..................................................... 31 
3.2.1 Problem Statement .................................................................................... 34 
3.2.2 Proposed Method ...................................................................................... 35 
3.2.3 Suboptimal Control ................................................................................... 40 
3.2.4 Numerical Example .................................................................................. 42 
3.3 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 49 
CHAPTER 4 TIME-DELAY SWITCH ATTACK ON NETWORKED CONTROL 
SYSTEMS......................................................................................................................... 51 
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 51 
4.2 TDS Attack Model on NCS .............................................................................. 52 
4.3 TDS Attacks in Communication Systems......................................................... 54 
4.4 Sabotage and Destabilizing Analysis of TDS Attack ....................................... 57 
4.4.1 Theoretical Analysis ................................................................................. 57 
4.4.2 TDS Attack on Load Frequency Control in Smart Grid ........................... 62 
4.4.3. TDS Attack on Peace Maker, an Application in Biomedical Systems ..... 75 
CHAPTER 5 TIME-DELAY SWITCH ATTACK DETECTION ................................... 83 
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 83 
 ix 
 
5.2 TDS Attack Detection and Real-Time Monitoring Method ............................. 85 
5.3 Simulation Result, TDS Attack Detection on Smart Grid Application ............ 88 
5.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 91 
CHAPTER 6 OVERCOMING STABILITY ISSUES OF A TIME-DELAY 
SWITCH ATTACK ON LINEAR NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS .................. 92 
6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 92 
6.2 Methodology ..................................................................................................... 93 
6.3 Controller Design Algorithm ............................................................................ 97 
6.4 Simulation Results ............................................................................................ 98 
6.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 105 
CHAPTER 7 CONTROL OF NONLINEAR SYSTEM UNDER A TDS ATTACK: 
EVALUATION OF METHODS .................................................................................... 106 
7.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 106 
7.2 Emotional Learning Controller (ELC) ............................................................ 107 
7.3 Simulation Result Based on ELC Controller: Evaluation of Methods ........... 110 
7.4 Local and Emergency Controller Design ........................................................ 113 
7.5 Simulation Result and Conclusion Using Local Controller-Based Design .... 115 
CHAPTER 8 CF-TDSR: A CRYPTOGRAPHY-FREE TDS RECOVERY 
PROTOCOL ................................................................................................................... 118 
8.1  Introduction .................................................................................................... 118 
8.2 Related Works ................................................................................................. 120 
8.3 A Unified Approach ........................................................................................ 121 
8.4 CF-TDSR: A Crypto-Free TDS Recovery Protocol ....................................... 124 
8.5 Simulation Results and Discussion ................................................................. 126 
8.5.1 TDS Attack on LFC Model..................................................................... 126 
8.5.2 Simulation of CF-TDSR on LFC System ............................................... 128 
8.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 135 
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS ............................................... 136 
9.1 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 136 
9.2 Future Works .................................................................................................. 138 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 140 
VITA ............................................................................................................................... 153 
 
 
 x 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE          PAGE 
 
Table  3.1: The Switching Patterns .................................................................................... 23 
Table  3.2: Cost Function Values for Different Delays of Different Iterations ................. 49 
Table  4.1: Scenario 1, Sequence of Events During a Replay TDS Attack ....................... 55 
Table  4.2: Scenario 2, Sequence of Events During Timestamps Alter TDS Attack ........ 56 
Table  4.3: Parameter Values for Two-Area Power System .............................................. 69 
Table  4.4: Parameters Value of Model (4.43)................................................................... 79 
  
 xi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE          PAGE 
 
Figure  2.1: A Typical Networked Control System ............................................................. 8 
Figure  2.2: Generalized Cyber Attacks on a Typical NCS. .............................................. 12 
Figure  3.1: CSBI and its Controller Configuration ........................................................... 21 
Figure  3.2: Sectors of the Proposed Switching for CSB ................................................... 21 
Figure  3.3: Three stages of different switching patterns for CSB (a) Stage I. (b) Stage 
II. (c) Stage III ................................................................................................................... 22 
 
Figure  3.4: Three Stages for Different Switching ............................................................. 23 
Figure  3.5: Layout of Experimental Setup ........................................................................ 29 
Figure  3.6: CSBI Performance with Conventional Control Method ................................ 30 
Figure  3.7: CSBI Performance with Proposed Control Method ....................................... 30 
Figure  3.8: Simulation Results of CSBI Response to Step Change of Active Power ...... 31 
Figure  3.9: Suboptimal Control Law )0.0( =dt  ................................................................ 43 
Figure  3.10: Suboptimal State Trajectory x1 )0.0( =dt  .................................................... 44 
Figure  3.11: Optimal State Trajectory x2 )0.0( =dt  ......................................................... 44 
Figure  3.12: Suboptimal Control Law )1.0( =dt  ............................................................. 45 
Figure  3.13: Suboptimal State Trajectory x1 )1.0( =dt  .................................................... 45 
Figure  3.14: Suboptimal State Trajectory x2 )1.0( =dt  .................................................... 46 
Figure  3.15: Suboptimal Control Law )2.0( =dt  ............................................................. 46 
Figure  3.16: Suboptimal State Trajectory x1 )2.0( =dt  .................................................... 47 
Figure  3.17: Suboptimal State Trajectory x2 )2.0( =dt  .................................................... 47 
 xii 
 
Figure  3.18: Suboptimal Control Law )3.0( =dt  ............................................................. 48 
Figure  3.19: Suboptimal State Trajectory x1 )3.0( =dt  .................................................... 48 
Figure  3.20: Suboptimal State Trajectory x2 )3.0( =dt  .................................................... 49 
Figure  4.1: Different Places that TDS Attacks can be Injected ........................................ 53 
Figure  4.2: A Simplified NCS System under a TDS Attack............................................. 55 
Figure  4.3: Step Function, h(t) .......................................................................................... 58 
Figure  4.4: Two-area Power System with LFC under a TDS Attack ............................... 63 
Figure  4.5: Eigenvalues of the System for Normal Operation and Attack by Different 
Time Delays ...................................................................................................................... 70 
 
Figure  4.6: Maximum Eigenvalues for Different Time-delay Attacks ............................. 71 
Figure  4.7: Case 1, (a) Frequency Deviation, KfΔ , (b) Power Deviation of Generator, 
K
gPΔ , (c) Value Position of the Turbine, KtuPΔ , (d) Tie-line Power Flow, 1pfPΔ  ................ 73 
 
Figure  4.8: Case 2, (a) Frequency Deviation KfΔ , (b) Power Deviation of Generator 
K
gPΔ , (c) Value Position of the Turbine KtuPΔ , (d) Tie-line Power Flow 1pfPΔ  ................. 74 
 
Figure  4.9: Heartbeat Control Model with Possible Control Attack ................................ 78 
Figure  4.10: Effect of TDS Attack on PID Controller of Heartbeat Model ..................... 82 
Figure  5.1: Block Diagram of Proposed Technique ......................................................... 85 
Figure  5.2: TDS Attack Detection and Tracking for Third State of First Power Area ..... 89 
Figure  5.3: TDS Attack Detection and Tracking for Simultaneous TDS Attack on 
Both Power Areas ............................................................................................................. 90 
 
Figure  5.4: TDS Attack Detection and Tracking for the Third State of the First Power 
Area ................................................................................................................................... 91 
 
Figure  5.5: TDS Attack Detection and Tracking for the Third State of the Second 
Power Area........................................................................................................................ 91 
 
Figure  6.1: Block Diagram of Proposed Control Technique ............................................ 93 
 xiii 
 
Figure  6.2: Tracking the Performance of a Single-input, Single-output System under 
TDS Attack ....................................................................................................................... 99 
 
Figure  6.3: Time Delay Tracking...................................................................................... 99 
Figure  6.4: An Adaptive Load Frequency Control for a Two-area Power System 
Which is Robust to the TDS Attack Using the Modified Method .................................. 100 
 
Figure  6.5: TDS Attack Tracking ................................................................................... 101 
Figure  6.6: All States for Two-area LFC Power System under TDS Attack Using the 
Modified Optimal Controller .......................................................................................... 101 
 
Figure  6.7: Time-Delay Tracking under a TDS Attack .................................................. 102 
Figure  6.8: Frequency Deviation, KfΔ  ........................................................................... 103 
Figure  6.9: Power Deviation of Generator, KgPΔ  ........................................................... 103 
Figure  6.10: Value Position of the Turbine, KtuPΔ  .......................................................... 103 
Figure  6.11: Tie-line Power Flow, 1pfPΔ  ......................................................................... 104 
Figure  6.12: TDS Attack Tracking ................................................................................. 104 
Figure  6.13: Value Position of the Turbine System during a TDS Attack for the First 
Power Area Control System............................................................................................ 105 
 
Figure  6.14: Value Position of the Turbine System during a TDS Attack for the 
Second Power Area Control System ............................................................................... 105 
 
Figure  7.1: Scheme of Brain Emotional Learning Model ............................................... 107 
Figure  7.2: Overall Computational Model of ELC ......................................................... 108 
Figure  7.3: Simulation Result of ECG Tracking for Second-Order Heartbeat Model 
Based on ELPIC Pacemaker Signal ................................................................................ 111 
 
Figure  7.4: Comparison of the ELPIC and the Classical PID for ECG Tracking 
during a TDS Attack ....................................................................................................... 112 
 
Figure  7.5: Comparison of the ELPIC and the MPC for ECG Tracking during a TDS 
Attack .............................................................................................................................. 112 
 
 xiv 
 
Figure  7.6: Block Diagram of Proposed Control Technique .......................................... 113 
 
Figure  7.7: Value Position of the Turbine System during a TDS Attack for the First 
Power-Area Control System ........................................................................................... 116 
 
Figure  7.8: Value Position of the Turbine System during a TDS Attack for the 
Second Power-Area Control System .............................................................................. 116 
 
Figure  8.1: Block Diagram of CF-TDSR ........................................................................ 124 
Figure  8.2: TDS Attack on one Power Area ................................................................... 132 
Figure  8.3: Composite TDS Attack on one State of Two-Power Area Plant ................. 134 
Figure  8.4: TDS Attack Injected at the Same Time on Both Power Areas .................... 135 
 
  
 xv 
 
SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AC  Alternating Current 
AGC  Automatic Generation Control 
ARP  Address Resolution Protocol 
CPU  Central Processing Unit 
CSBI  Current Source Boost Inverter 
CSI  Current Source Inverter 
DC  Direct Current 
DCS  Distributed Control System 
DoS  Denial of Service 
DPA  Differential Power Analysis 
DSP  Digital Signal Processor 
ECG  Electrocardiogram 
ELC  Emotional Learning Controller 
ELPIC  Emotional Learning PI controller 
FDI  Fault Data Injection 
FPGA  Field-Programmable Gate Array 
HJB  Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman 
HPM  Homotopy Perturbation Method 
HRV  Heart Rate Variability 
HTTP  HyperText Transfer Protocol 
ICS  Industrial Control System 
LFC  Load Frequency Control 
 xvi 
 
LTI  Linear Time Invariant 
MAC  Media Access Control 
NACK  Negative Acknowledgement 
NCS  Networked Control System 
NPCS  Networked Power Control System 
OC  Optimal Controller 
PCT  Proposed Control Technique 
PID  Proportional Integral Derivative  
PLC  Programmable Logic Controller 
PMU  Phase Measurement Unit 
PWM  Pulse Width Modulation 
RHP  Right Hand Plane 
SA  Sensitivity Approach 
SAA  Successive Approximate Approach 
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
SE  Sustainable Energy 
SL  Sensing Loop 
SPA  Simple Power Analysis 
SVPWM Space-Vector Pulse Width Modulation 
TCP  Transmission Control Protocol 
TDS  Time-Delay Switch 
TOC  Traditional Optimal Controller 
TPBVP Two Point Boundary Value Problem 
 xvii 
 
VSI  Voltage Source Inverter 
WAMS Wide Area Measurement System 
 
 
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1                                                                                     
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Statement of Problem Area 
Control systems have many applications in the industry. An innovation in control systems 
is the networked control system (NCS), which is used to monitor and control systems in 
wide areas, enabling engineers to more easily configure, monitor and control devices. In 
recent years, the security of networked control systems has been an important challenge 
for many researchers. Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) include Networked Control 
Systems (NCSs), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), Process Control 
Systems (PCSs), Distributed Control Systems (DCSs), Load Frequency Control (LFC) 
and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). Security of the abovementioned ICSs plays 
an important role in the successful performance of industrial and critical infrastructures. 
Energy and power sectors, transportation system sectors, water and wastewater system 
sectors, healthcare and public health sectors are examples of industries facing a high 
probability of attacks on their performance. Along with the development and 
advancement of security schemes for control systems during the past several years, there 
have also been many cyber attacks.  This is evidence that control systems are not very 
secure in light of cyber attacks. 
The following is a summary of several attacks that occurred in control systems in various 
industries:  
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• The energy and power industry is one of the most important industries in the 
world, which demands high security. Any failure in security of this industry will 
cause catastrophic damage to society. Many past and ongoing research efforts 
attempt to make this industry tech smart and globalized in terms of control and 
monitoring. The blackout in India in August 2012, and North American blackout 
in 2003 have brought serious attention the immediate needs of new schemes to 
prevent the occurrence of cyber attacks. [1, 2] 
• Water and wastewater systems clean all of the waste and harmful microscopic 
viruses in our water supply sphere. In January 2000, an incident of attack on a 
sewage control system in Australia was reported. During a four-month period, 
these problems eventually led to the flooding of the grounds of a nearby hotel, a 
park, and a river with a million liters of sewage. [3] 
• The natural gas industry has also been targeted by attackers. In 2000, the Russian 
Interior Ministry recorded attacks to their control systems. The hacker accessed 
the control system  that regulates gas flow [4].  
• Transportation systems are expanding quickly. Hackers can attack the control 
systems in this industry and make them harmful and dangerous.  Currently, train 
tramway tracks are wireless and remote-controlled. In 2008, a teenager modified a 
TV remote, resulting in four derailments and many injuries [5].  
• Biomedical devices usually involve control systems.  The proper use of these 
devices is a critical necessity in the public health industry. Recently, the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security underscored some threats affecting almost 300 
medical devices. Wireless devices such as pacemakers are a possible target of 
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attack. The false data injection, denial of service, and other types of attacks pose 
as dangerous threats to patients.   
Traditionally, control systems are designed in normal environments, with no attacks 
involved in the design process. In this case, any distortion, delay or attack to any part of 
control systems such as sensors, communication lines and others, can result in an 
unstable system or even failure of the system. 
Currently, industries use security algorithms that were introduced by IT researchers, 
which stand the chance of not working efficiently or properly for the networked control 
systems under a TDS attack. Hence, control systems are in need of hardware and 
software protection protocol. 
Based on the information above, security analyses of NCSs could improve our 
understanding of the possible effects and results of cyber attacks. Also, the design and 
implementation of safe, robust and secure controller and communication protocol could 
ensure the reliability of industries that use networked control systems. The goal of this 
research is to study and analyze different types of attacks, in particular, the Time-Delay 
Switch (TDS) attack on the NCS, as well as to drive the general model of the system 
under TDS attacks. This research also proposes a new robust controller for the network 
control systems experiencing a TDS attack. The new controller overcomes the stability 
issues caused by TDS attacks. Furthermore, an attack-resistant communication protocol is 
implemented to guarantee the stability of networked control systems experiencing a TDS 
attack. 
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1.2 Problem Statement and Research Questions 
The research for the development of a robust and stable automated networked control 
system that will resist cyber attacks consists of the following tasks: 
1. The current networked control systems were designed under normal operations, 
with no attacks included in the design process. It is necessary to outline a reliable and 
general model for a system under a TDS attack, and then design the robust controllers.  
2. Investigating the effects of attacks on the stability of systems under a TDS attack 
is a difficult task because an attack can occur at any time interval and can be a random 
process. 
3. Attackers can target wireless, fiber or other type of communication medium and 
disrupt the system. An attacker can access the communication channel and cause a denial 
of service, or cause a delay, as well as a data jam or an injection of fault data into the 
system. In this case, the controller either does not obtain sensor information or receives 
wrong data in the decision-making process. 
4. Since an attack is a random event, determining an appropriate protocol, technique, 
and software package for estimating and detecting the type of attack is complicated. 
5. Separating a TDS attack from a natural delay and disturbance is a difficult task. 
Following is a summary of the research questions: 
• Is it necessary to study the stability of networked control systems experiencing a 
TDS attack? 
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• Can TDS attacks be detected and tracked in real time for linear systems? 
• Is it possible to design a secure and robust controller to overcome the effects of 
TDS attacks for NCSs? 
• Is it possible to design a secure communication protocol between controllers and 
plants for a system experiencing a TDS attack? 
1.3 Dissertation Roadmap 
The five main research themes of this dissertation can be described as follows: 
 Introducing a new type of attack on NCSs called a “TDS attack” and showing that 
this attack can disturb and disable a NCS. 
 Detecting and tracking TDS attacks in real time, alerting the controller center, and 
using the emergency controller design. 
 Proposing a new controller design to overcome the stability effects of TDS 
attacks. 
 Proposing a new communication protocol to solve the stability and effects of TDS 
attacks on NCSs.  
 Evaluation of a controller’s methods to find the best existing controller design for 
nonlinear NCSs experiencing TDS attacks.   
Accordingly, this dissertation is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides a general definition of a NCS and its applications. It follows with a 
discussion on NCS security challenges and the different types of attacks on NCS.  
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Furthermore, this chapter includes a general model of attacks for NCS, along with 
relevant literature related to NCS security and the different type of attacks.  
Chapter 3 examines the effects of natural time delays in control systems.  The first 
section provides time-delay effects and solutions for controlling a three-phase single 
stage current source boost inverter. The second section discusses an optimal control 
problem with time delay and presents the design complexity of the controller and effects 
of ignoring time delays in the cost function result. 
Chapter 4 introduces a new type of attack on NCS called the time-delay switch (TDS) 
attack.  It provides a stability analysis of a NCS experiencing a TDS attack. It also shows 
how TDS attacks can cause stability issues on two real-world applications. One is the 
networked power control systems, which is the Load Frequency Control (LFC) on smart 
grid applications. The second one involves biomedical application. It provides simulation 
results of TDS attacks on wireless pacemakers by understanding the dynamic model of 
the system.  
Chapter 5 includes a literature review about research dealing with the natural time delays 
of control systems.  It also contains a new method that detects and tracks real-time TDS 
attacks on NCS. At the end of this chapter, simulation results display the power of this 
method on LFC applications. 
Chapter 6 details a simple proposed control method to overcome stability issues of TDS 
attacks on linear NCS. Simulation results of a sample complex example and LFC on two 
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interconnected power areas show that this controller can prevent stability and inefficiency 
effects of TDS attacks on NCS. 
Chapter 7 describes the Emotional Learning Controller (ELC) in detail. It also evaluates 
ELC’s robustness and stability when compared with two other controllers under a TDS 
attack. It also introduces a local and emergency controller design for a NCS under a TDS 
attack.  
Chapter 8 provides a new, simple communication protocol that does not need encryption 
techniques. This chapter proposes a protocol called “CF-TDSR” in order to address 
issues caused by a TDS attack on a NCS. It also includes simulation results of using the 
CF-TDSR protocol on an LFC system under a TDS attack.  
Chapter 9 concludes this dissertation with a discussion on the findings and implications 
for potential future research. 
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CHAPTER 2                                                                                     
LITERATURE REVIEW AND DESIGN FUNDAMENTALS 
2.1 Networked Control Systems 
A Networked Control System (NCS) is a control system in which the control feedback 
process is closed through a real-time communication network [6]. In this case, the control 
system can be shared with other nodes outside the control system. Figure 2.1 shows a 
typical NCS. In this figure, sensors measure the output signal from the plant and transmit 
it through the communication channels to the controller. Then, the controller compares 
the signals with the reference values and injects the control signals into the plant.  
 
Figure 2.1: A Typical Networked Control System 
NCSs are of pervasive use in the industry and are an integral part of any infrastructure. 
They are the information communication and control highway. NCSs are sometimes 
referred to as industrial control systems, industrial control networks, command and 
control networks, distributed control systems, or the World Wide Web, depending on the 
application and context. Technological advances in communication and control made it 
possible to monitor and control many systems over a wide geographical area. This is the 
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essence of NCSs that makes it easier for engineers to configure, monitor, and control 
devices from a distance, and make it possible to coordinate the operations of a large and 
distributed infrastructure with ease and efficiency.   
As previously stated, NCSs have many applications [6] in the industry, including the 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), Process Control System (PCS), 
Distributed Control System (DCS), Load Frequency Control (LFC), and Programmable 
Logic Controllers (PLC). Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) play an important role in the 
protection of industrial and critical infrastructures, such as the energy and power sector, 
transportation systems sector, water and wastewater systems sector, healthcare and public 
health sector, etc. Hence, the security of the controllers is very important.  In the 
following sections, the focus will be on the security and stability of NCSs.  
2.2 Challenges for Networked Control Systems 
In recent years, the security and stability of NCSs has been at the center stage for 
researchers, engineers, and governmental entities, since exploited security risks could 
have potential catastrophic consequences [7, 8]. Although the security and stability 
schemes for NCSs have advanced in the past several years, there have been many 
acknowledged cyber attacks and confirmations that these control systems are not very 
safe and stable in the face of attacks and natural disturbances.  
A survey of literature indicates that the study and improvement of the security of NCSs is 
necessary. The first key problem of conventional control systems is that they were 
designed in a normal environment with no attacks considered. In this case, any attack to 
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any part of a control system, such as sensors and communication links, can drive the 
system to an unstable mode and cause inefficiency.  
There are many researchers that have studied these problems. A class of False Data 
Injection (FDI) attacks that bypassed the bad data detection in SCADA systems was 
proposed by [9]. In [10], adversaries launched FDI attacks against state estimates of 
power systems, with only the knowledge of the perturbed model of the power system. Y. 
Mo et al. [9] studied FDI attacks on a control system equipped with a Kalman filter. In 
[11], the smallest set of hacker-controlled meters was identified  as performing an 
unobservable attack. Recently, Amin et al. [12] considered the Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks on the communication channels in the measurements telemetered in remote 
terminal units (RTUs) sent to the control center of power systems. They demonstrated 
that a hacker may make power systems unstable by properly designing DoS-attack 
sequences. Liu et al. [13] considered how a switched-DoS attack on a smart grid can 
affect the dynamic performance of its power systems. The Viking projects [14] 
considered cyber attacks on the Load Frequency Control (LFC), one of a few automatic 
control loops in SCADA power systems. They analyzed the impacts of cyber attacks on 
the control centers of power systems by using reachability methods. However, they only 
considered attacks on the control centers, which are usually harder to attack than the 
communication channels in the SL of a power system.  
The above literature review talked about current problems and existing attacks. Also, it 
explained how different researchers attempt to solve them. However, in papers that 
described attacks to NCS, not much research has been done on the making the design of 
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the controller more robust and optimal.  In [12], a NCS under a DOS attack is modeled. 
They used the stochastic control theory to secure the system, but only the LTI model was 
studied.  
Another key problem in network control systems is that there are no solid methods that 
prevent attackers from hacking controllers, wireless sensors, reference inputs, etc. 
Currently, industries use security algorithms to secure their control networks. These 
algorithms were introduced by IT researchers in the context of the World Wide Web, 
where there is no mandate for real-time data. Therefore, the security of NCSs cannot be 
guaranteed when using those algorithms. This problem, along with existing, relevant 
literature, is addressed in detail in Chapter 8.   
2.3 Time-Delay Estimation  
This dissertation focuses on stability issues caused by time delays on control systems. 
There are many studies on time-delay estimation, all of which have limitations. Tan [15] 
developed two different time varying time-delay estimation methods for nonlinear 
systems using neural networks. The first method is an indirect time-delay estimator 
procedure using nonlinear programming. The second one is a direct time-delay estimation 
scheme that uses a neural network to construct a time-delay estimator. The methods 
proposed by the author show that his/her method is more general and accurate than the 
simple linear time-delay estimation procedures [16, 17] for time-varying time-delay 
signals.  However, the methods proposed are complex, and the estimation process takes 
time to obtain results. Examination of their results shows that it is obvious that the 
algorithm took 80 sec to estimate and learn a 4-sec time-delay value.  Also, their methods 
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were not used in the context of real-time control.  Furthermore, to train the neural 
network, the authors used a specific pattern of input, or a combination of sinusoids, to 
achieve a good estimation function. 
It should be noted that the time-delay calculation procedure, either by the neural network 
or the nonlinear programming method, is done offline before the algorithms are applied 
to estimate a real-time varying signal.  
The method works well in estimating a slowly varying time delay (the time delay was 
modeled by a ramp function to force the neural network to learn it slowly), but fails when 
tested with switched time-delay attack (e.g. step time delay).   
2.4 Different Types of Attacks on NCS 
This section introduces a generalized attack model and illustrates it for the most 
important attacks in detail. Later in this chapter, the most common attacks on NCSs are 
described in detail. Let us consider a NCS (f, g) with controller h as shown in Figure 2.2.
 
Figure 2.2: Generalized Cyber Attacks on a Typical NCS. 
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The system with the controller and the communication channel can be described 
concisely as an output feedback system having the following form: 
)(
),,(
xgy
uxtfx
=
=  (2.1) 
where f is a function describing the plant behavior, x is the plant state vector and u is the 
control vector. The function, g, describes the plant output and the communication 
methodology used. The controller is described as: 
)( yhu = (2.2) 
where y is the information communicated to the controller about the plant state. The 
function h is describing the controller. 
An attack on the control system involves altering any component of the NCS. A general 
attack can be described as a function that alters any of the components of the system: 
),,,,,,()~,~,~,~,
~
,~,
~
( tuyxhgftuyxhgf Λ=  (2.3)
where )~,~,~,~,~,~,~( tuyxhgf  are the corrupted functions and information as result of the attack 
Λ.  
The following are the most possible attacks on the NCS, especially on the Networked 
Power Control System (NPCS): 
I. Denial of Service (DoS) 
This attack seeks to sabotage a NCS by overwhelming its communication and 
computational resources in order to prevent it from working [18]. This attack can be 
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applied to multiple layers in a NCS. This type of attack can take place between the plant 
and the controller. The DoS can disconnect service or data from the plant to the 
controller, from the controller to the plant, or both at the same time. In the general model 
of attacks, this attack can be described as follows: 


=
attack
otherwisey
y
α
~  (2.4)
where α  can be zero, or some random value.  
II. Fault Analysis Attack 
This class of attack injects faults into a device performing some type of computation. 
These faults can be anything from unusual environmental conditions (increased heat, for 
example), the injection of a laser beam at the appropriate frequency [19], or the injection 
of data packets that collide with legitimate packets [20]. The work of Yuan and Liu et al. 
showed that the load redistribution attack [21-23] is a false data injection attack by 
modifying selected information in a SCADA power system. This attack is especially 
dangerous due to it being able to manipulate the estimation of a system power flow. 
Depending on whether the attack is short-term or long-term, it can have damaging effects 
on the security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED) price estimation [22]. This attack 
can be modeled as follows: 


=
attackz
otherwisey
y~  (2.5)
where z is an input signal designed by the attacker for the purpose of either misleading 
the control system, causing system inefficiencies, or sabotaging it.  
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III. Physical Layer Attacks  
One only needs to connect to the communication channel rather than the actual network 
to launch this attack [24]. Channel jamming attacks become one of the most efficient 
ways that attackers use, and are one of the most dangerous for utilities and customers 
alike. Examples of such attacks include the continuous emission and injection of high 
power wave tones and FM modulated noise into the communication channel at a brute 
force level. A more sophisticated attack is detailed by the work of Proano and Lazos, 
wherein they exploit specific weaknesses in communications protocols (in their case, 
TCP) to perform their attacks [25]. Their selective jamming attack sees the hacker 
classifying packets in real time, decoding the control field at the MAC layer, and 
corrupting them before the end of their transmissions. 
IV. MAC Layer Attacks 
The Media Access Control (MAC) layer is responsible for two-way communication and 
is susceptible to attackers who wish to modify parameters, which gives the attacker better 
leeway in accessing the network at the cost of degrading network performance for 
legitimate customers on the same channel [24]. Examples include spoofing attacks, which 
can target both network availability and integrity. One way this attack may be realized is 
through sending fake Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) messages and packets into the 
local area network. The attacker’s MAC address becomes associated with the IP address 
of a legitimate host, causing traffic meant for the host to go to the hacker [26]. 
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V. Network/Transport Layer Attack 
TCP/IP protocols are said to be the two more vulnerable standards in the network 
infrastructure, due to the use of email as the communication media [24, 27]. Traffic 
flooding and worm attacks through the internet have led to serious performance issues 
[24]. Buffer flooding attacks through the DNP3 protocol were examined in the literature 
[28, 29]. The work of East et al. saw the creation of a taxonomy of such attacks, which 
can range from sending fake DNP3 messages in order to reset, manipulate, or corrupt 
data from a substation [30]. 
VI. Application Layer Attack  
Application layer attacks seek to exhaust the resources of a communication channel, 
focusing on transmission bandwidth in computers and routers [24]. These attacks seek to 
limit the bandwidths of CPU’s and I/O’s of connected devices. The work of Ranjan et al. 
saw the study and categorization of a number of such attacks. A flood attack sends 
requests at higher than normal frequencies, while asymmetrical attacks send high-
workload requests. A one-shot attack involves the attacker spreading the workload over 
multiple sessions, using HTTP floods to stress the servers over time [31]. 
VII. Decryption Attacks 
This attack is used to discover the encryption key of a network in order to connect to it 
and steal its data. An attacker may do this by accessing and obtaining the physical frames 
of the network, and storing enough of them so they can be decrypted by using correct 
algorithms [32]. Another form of attack that yields success is called the “side channel 
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attack.” This attack exploits some aspect of a physical system that employs a data 
encryption algorithm [32].  
VIII. Electromagnetic Attacks  
These attacks deal with discerning the encoded plaintext of a power line message through 
the leakage of electromagnetic radiation [19]. 
These attacks use special probes placed at various locations along the unit or circuit in 
question. The probe location depends on detecting direct or unintentional emissions. 
Direct emissions are intentional current flows through a line, where short currents burst 
with sharp rising edges, which can cause large bandwidths [33]. Unintentional emissions 
are those electromagnetic leakages that couple to those of other circuit components or 
cabling. These emissions are typically modulations of the carrier signals that are either 
present or have been introduced into the device. Under these definitions, direct emissions 
are the more difficult of the two to detect, requiring close proximity to the device in 
question. An attacker would likely prefer the unintentional emissions, as these provide a 
wide spectrum of signals to probe and through which encryption keys in the data may be 
found [33, 34].  
Many proofs of the concept have been demonstrated in the laboratory. The work of Enev 
and Gupta [35] experimented on the information leakage from eight televisions 
connected to the same power line. It was found that the radiative interference patterns of 
TV power supplies yielded discernible information about the media being played. The 
work of Hayashi et al. [36-38]  demonstrated the viability of obtaining secret keys from 
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the radiation patterns of power and communication cables attached to FPGA boards. 
Their work showed that cryptographic key information may leak from a near field [36] 
and far field [37] radiation patterns. 
IX. Power Analysis Attacks  
Power analysis attacks are characterized by analyzing the use of the electrical power of a 
device while it performs an encryption algorithm [39]. They are divided into two classes, 
simple and differential. Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks observe the data visually 
(oscilloscope, for example), and interpret what cryptographic algorithm the signal has 
been encoded with. Differential Power Analysis (DPA) applies statistical error-correcting 
algorithms to SPA by monitoring trends in the data. DPA attacks are especially 
dangerous, as they can be so precise that even the switching of a transistor can give away 
an encryption key. All cryptographic algorithms, and devices running them, have so far 
been shown to be vulnerable to DPA [39]. 
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CHAPTER 3                                                                                     
NATURAL TIME DELAY IN CONTROL SYSTEMS, EFFECTS AND 
SOLUTIONS 
3.1 Time-Delay Effects on a Three-Phase Current Source Boost Inverter 
Sustainable Energy (SE) is the future energy source [40]. However, in order to use SE 
sources efficiently, it is necessary to integrate them into a power grid. Inverters and 
electronic circuits are needed for this purpose [41]. These interface electronic circuits are 
recognized as the SE inverters. The SE inverters should convert Direct Current (DC) to 
Alternating Current (AC) with as little harmonic content as possible. To do so, they 
should be designed to harmonize their outputs with the utility grid line. 
There are many different topologies for SE inverters, such as Current Source Boost 
Inverters (CSBIs) [42-44], Voltage Source Inverters (VSIs) [45], multi-level inverters 
[46, 47], and matrix converters [48, 49]. VSIs have many advantages and  been used in 
many industrial applications [50]. However, despite other types of inverters, CSBIs can 
invert and boost currents in a single stage from a DC source, such as photovoltaic cells to 
an AC voltage [51]. This advantage recognizes CSBIs as one of the best choices for SE 
grid-connected conversion systems. 
In this section, the switching pattern and circuit topology of the three-phase CSBI 
proposed in [52] are considered. The suggested CSBI offers a better robust method in 
terms of the control of the voltage and the injected power based on a novel switching 
pattern. 
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Despite the advantage, the proposed CSBI does not consider the time-delay effects of 
hardware, software and components on grid synchronization. Furthermore, results show 
more harmonics and less current waveform quality. 
Most of the inverters can be controlled with digital signal processors (DSPs). DSPs offer 
high performance in feedback control, as well as user flexibility for design and 
implementation. However, a time delay exists in the electronic components and 
microprocessors. In a DSP system, there is a predictable effecting time delay in each 
sampling cycle [53]. This delay has a significant effect on switching control, monitoring 
and feedback control of the CSBI [52]. 
In this effort, the focus is on the time-delay effect on a grid-connected CSBI with a recent 
literature switching pattern. This section is organized as follows:  Section 3.1.1 discusses 
the SVPWM-based switching pattern for a grid-connected three-phase current source 
inverter and circuit topology proposed by [52]. Then, the effect of time delays on 
DSPACE is shown and the proposed technique to overcome this issue is discussed. 
Section 3.1.3 will show the results using the proposed technique, which produces less 
harmonic and higher waveform quality, followed by the conclusion.  
3.1.1 Switching Pattern and Control of CSBI 
A. Switching Pattern  
The Current Source Boost Inverter (CBSI) topology is illustrated in Figure 3-1, based on 
the modified Space-Vector PWM technique, called the “SVPWM.” A detailed 
description of the developed switching pattern is presented in [52]. 
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Figure 3.1: CSBI and its Controller Configuration 
In [54], the capability of this technique is demonstrated specifically for controlling the 
active and reactive powers effectively. The main purpose of the switching pattern is to 
inject in-phase sinusoidal currents into the three phases of the grid, whereas the dc 
inductor current is kept at a constant, desired level. In terms of the SVPWM method, in 
order to achieve an effective operation, six sections in each grid voltage cycle are 
proposed in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2: Sectors of the Proposed Switching for CSB 
In each section, there is one charging stage by keeping the switches on to store energy in 
the dc link inductor, and two discharging stages by applying the two line-to-line voltages 
to the output of the inverter to inject the stored energy into the grid. The inductor current 
increases and output currents are supplied by Cs. In Stages II and III shown in Figure 3.3 
(b) and (c), the inductor current discharges through Cs, in which the two line-to-line 
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voltages abV  and acV  are applied to the inverter, respectively. Since phase “a” is common 
between these two stages, this phase is used for the charging stage.  
The switching pattern on all sectors can be found in Figure 3.4 and Table 3.1. Here ct is 
the charging time; 1dt  and 2dt  are the time intervals of discharging. The relationship of 
these time intervals yields 
1 2s c d dT t t t= + +  (3.1)
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 3.3: Three stages of different switching patterns for CSB (a) Stage I. (b) Stage II. (c) Stage III 
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These time intervals must satisfy the following objectives: (i) The inverter output current 
contains minimum harmonic contents, and (ii) the dc-link inductor current stays at a fixed 
level. 
 
Figure 3.4: Three Stages for Different Switching 
Table 3.1: The Switching Patterns 
Section I II III IV V VI 
U1 vab vac vbc vba vca vcb 
U2 vac vbc vba vca vcb vab 
Sw1 Ts td1 0 tc 0 td2 
Sw2 tc 0 td2 Ts td1 0 
Sw3 0 td2 Ts td1 0 tc 
Sw4 td1 0 tc 0 td2 Ts 
Sw5 0 tc 0 td2 Ts td1 
Sw6 td2 Ts td1 0 tc 0 
 
As a result, if )cos(6 tVv rmsab ω= measured as the reference signal for this method, the 
duty cycles of the two discharging and one charging time intervals are computed as 
follows: 
1 0cos( )d m tω α= −  (3.2)
2 0
2
cos( )
3
d m t
π
ω α= − −  (3.3)
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where d1=td1/Ts and d2=td2/Ts are the two discharging duty cycle and 
scc Ttddd /)(1 21 =+−=  is the charging duty cycle, m is the modulation index and α0 is the 
phase shift with respect to the line-line reference voltage, vab. 
B. State-Space Averaged Modelling of CSBI  
The state-space model, considered in this study, is defined as 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
x t Ax t Bu t
y t Cx t
= +
=

 (3.4)
where, x, u and y are the states, control inputs, and outputs of the system, while A, B and 
C represent the system matrix, control matrix and output matrix, respectively. The large-
signal state-space-averaged model of the grid-connected single-stage boost inverter 
system can be represented in the synchronous dq-frame of reference, as shown in (3.5).  
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 (3.5)
The state vector x consists of the state variables of the system, which are the independent 
inductor current and capacitor voltages, i.e. x = [idc, vq, vd]T. Also, u = [vdc, vqs, vds]T 
represents the system inputs. The modulation angle φ is constant, but modulation index m 
regulates the injected active powers to the grid. 
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3.1.2 Practical Control with Time Delay and Solution 
A time delay can be estimated around a sampling period in most DSP-based controllers, 
however, a DSP board can introduce a greater time delay, and it depends on the 
complexity of application, parallel processors, and threats. Here, in the experimental result 
and setup, a dSPACE multi DSP board DS1104 was used. This board can be directly 
programmed by MathWorks joint with Real-Time Interface (RTI) developed by dSPACE 
using MATLAB/SIMULINK and is connected to a desktop computer. The board has two 
processors: The first one is a master DSP that operates at 250MHz, and second one is a 
TMS320F240 microcontroller that operates at 20MHz as a slave DSP. The master DSP 
generates and debugs the control algorithm and also monitors the data. The slave DSP acts 
as a modulator for the master DSP [53]. 
In practical use, a time delay exists in the controlling signal and the sensing signal. For 
grid-connected applications, the SE-inverters should be synchronized with grid signals. 
Two voltage sensors perform this task. The data from these two sensors proceeds to the 
Analog to Digital (A/D) Inputs/Outputs (I/O) of dSPACE, and then triggers the SVWPM 
algorithm to generate the switching signal. On the other hand, switching signals should be 
sent to the SE-CS inverter using dSPACE D/A I/O and should be modulated by the slave 
DSP. Both sensing and generating switching signals processes introduce time delays in the 
system. Estimating and finding solutions for these delays improves system performance 
and avoids unwanted failures. For now, let an assumption include switching the signal 
time delay. The time delay acquainted with the dSPACE controller can be calculated by 
[53]: 
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0.5exc sT Tτ = +  (3.6)
whereτ is the time delay, Texc is the execution time of the master DSP and Ts is the 
sampling time. 
In (3.6), if Texc is greater than 0.5Ts, the resulting time delay is longer than one sampling 
cycle. In this case, if the time delays existing in the control input (switching signals) and 
feedback section (grid voltage) of the system is ignored, then the dynamic performance of 
the system can be corrupted and even worse, become unstable and fail. Here, the focus is 
on the time delay existing in the sensing line. 
To overcome this problem, a step function is sent to one of the dSPACE D/A I/O’s and 
obtains its feedback from the A/D I/O’s. As soon as the step function is detected, the clock 
stops and the results are divided by two. This provides a real-time track of the time delay 
for both sensing signals. If this time delay is larger than the sampling time, it should be 
estimated. A buffer will be used to store all data received from the grid sensors for each 
sampling period. As the states are periodic, one can easily predict and estimate the current 
phase of the grid for all three phases and send appropriate switching patterns to the 
system. For a time delay on the control input, a modified controller can be used, as 
follows.  
Consider the state-space model for a SVPWM switching control (3.4). Following is the 
discretized state space model of the system without a time delay: 
( 1) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
x k Gx k Hu k
y k Cx k
+ = +
=
 (3.7)
 27 
 
where, 
0
Ts AH B e dλ λ=  and  ATsG e= . The control input signal is designed based on the 
state feedback algorithm [55]: 
( ) ( ) ( )I I Pu k K x k K x k= −  (3.8)
where KI and KP  are the integration and proportional gains that can be determined by the 
pole-placement method. Also, the new state variable xI can be calculated from: 
( ) ( 1) ( ) ( )rI Ix k x k y k y k= − + −  (3.9)
where ry  is the reference input. With the above definitions, the following are the new 
state space model results: 
ˆ( 1) ( ) ( ) ( 1)
ˆ( ) ( )
X k AX k Bu k Dy kr
y k CX k
+ = + + +
=
 
 (3.10)
Where [ ]( ) ( ) ( ) TIX k x k x k= , 0ˆ GA CG I= −
    , [ ]ˆ 0C C= [ ]ˆ
T
B H CH= −  and [ ]ˆ 0 TD I=  . 
If there is a time delay in the control section, the Equations (3.7) will be converted to:  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
x t Ax t Bu t
y t Cx t
τ= + −
=

 (3.11)
 In order to solve the time-delay effect in the switching control signal (3.11), an observer 
controller was used based on modification of the smith predictor [52, 55]. The control 
input signal under the time-delay effect can be found by substituting states x by its 
predicted xˆ  in (3.8): 
)(ˆ)()( kxKkxKku PII −=  (3.12)
and y by ˆCx in (3.9): 
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)(ˆ)()1()( kxCkykxkx rII −+−=  (3.13)
where xˆ  is the estimated state vector calculated by the observer that predicts the state 
vector x  oneτ ahead of time. In the case whereτ is larger than sampling period Ts, the 
state estimate can be calculated as follows. 
1 2
ˆ ˆˆ ( ) ( ) ( 2 ) ( 1)x k G x k H u k H u k= + − + −

(3.14)
where ˆ AG e τ= , 11
0
ˆ
TsAT AH Be e dλ λ=  , 
0
ˆ
2
sT
AH B e d
τ
λ λ
−
=  . 
3.1.3  Simulation and Experimental Results 
The simulation and experimental results are presented in this section to show the 
effectiveness of the proposed controller based on the time delay. Figure 3.5 shows the 
layout of the experimental setup. The circuit parameters in this simulation were selected 
as: Vdc=30 volt, Cs=15 µF, Ldc=12 mH, Lf=2mH. The control section is implemented using 
MATLAB Simulink, in conjunction with the dSPACE 1104 control block, which is 
interfaced with the hardware. The PWM switching frequency is set to be 3 kHz, and the 
line-to-line rms voltage value is 207.846 volt.   
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Figure 3.5: Layout of Experimental Setup 
Figure 3.6 illustrates the experimental results of inverter current and output voltage when 
the conventional control algorithm is applied (without consideration of time delay). Since 
the waveforms of all the three phases are similar, only the current and the voltage of phase 
A are shown. It can be seen that the inverter current fluctuates effectively due to the time 
delay of the controller, which it is not taken into account. On the other hand, as shown in 
Figure 3.7, using the proposed control method, the fluctuation in the inverter current and 
output voltage is properly eradicated and the CSI operates properly. To evaluate the 
dynamics of the CSI, simulation is carried out to investigate the response of the active 
power of the converter output to a step change of reference power.  
 30 
 
 
Figure 3.6: CSBI Performance with Conventional Control Method 
 
Figure 3.7: CSBI Performance with Proposed Control Method 
Figures 3.8(a) and 3.8(b) show the simulation of the converter current when the active 
power, Pref, has instantly changed at t=5sec from 100 to 200 watts and 100 to 50, 
respectively. As shown, the controllers can effectively track the change of the active 
power references without harming the stability of the system.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 3.8: Simulation Results of CSBI Response to Step Change of Active Power 
3.2 Optimal Control Problem with Time-Delay 
The goal of the optimal control theory is to determine control laws for a given dynamic 
system subjected to optimizing one or more predefined criteria. Time delays in biology, 
chemistry, electronics and mechanics domains [56-60] add one level of difficulty in the 
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design phase of the control system the process. A valuable amount of studies in the 
control theory have been dedicated to the optimal control theory of time-delay systems.  
Different approaches have been proposed, each with its own pros and cons from the 
accuracy and computational complexity point of view in theory and practical 
implementation [61-65]. The conventional techniques for solving optimal control 
problems can be categorized into two broad classes: (1) direct methods where the 
problem is being transferred into a nonlinear programming space by parameterization and 
discretization operators [60, 66], and (2) indirect methods that find the solution by 
applying a dynamic programming on Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation [61] or 
applying Pontryagin's maximum principle in a two-point boundary-value problem 
(TPBVP) [62].  
Since solving a nonlinear HJB partial differential equation is complex in most cases, 
many researchers avoid using it. An excellent literature review on HJB is provided in 
[63]. On the other hand, one of the most accurate methods for solving optimal control 
problems is to set a series of optimal first-order necessary conditions based on 
Pontryagin's Maximum Principle. This method yields more accurate solutions and 
provides more confidence with the obtained responses than the others. However, the 
Pontryagin’s conditions that produce a system of nonlinear boundary-value differential 
equations are difficult to solve.  As mentioned above, the TPBVP resulting from 
Pontryagin’s maximum principle does not have an analytical solution, hence, researchers 
are trying to find an approximate solution for these problems and have introduced the 
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Sensitivity Approximation Approach [64], and the Successive Approximation Approach 
(SAA) [65]. 
Here, the Homotopy Perturbation Method (HPM) is proposed and applied to solve the 
two-point boundary-value problem (TPBVP). The idea of HPM is to introduce a 
Homotopy parameter that takes its values from range [0 1]. The solution of each stage of 
deformation is close to that one of the previous stage. In brief, the system has the original 
form of equation at 1=p , and by progressively decreasing the value of p  to 0 at the final 
stage of deformations, the favorable solution is found. HPM provides an accurate solution 
in a few numbers of perturbations and therefore speeds up the convergence. The proposed 
approach considers a quadratic cost function as the criterion and transforms the  time-
delay optimal control problem into a time-delay and time-advance in the shape of a Two-
Point Boundary-Value Problem (TPBVP), and then finally converts it to a set of linear 
time invariant TPBVP by applying the Homotopy Perturbation Method. Unlike 
traditional approaches [61-65], the presented technique only requires solving a sequence 
of linear TPBVPs that effectively reduce the required amount of computations and makes 
it more practical when comparing it with the approximation approaches applied in 
conventional platforms.  
Section 3.2.1 introduces the nonlinearity and time delay in the optimal control theory, and 
Section 3.2.2 discusses the main idea of the Homotopy Perturbation Method (HPM). A 
new algorithm to find a suboptimal solution based on the HPM is presented in Section 
3.2.3. Results are described in Section 3.2.4, followed by the conclusion. 
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3.2.1 Problem Statement 
Consider a linear system with a time delay in state, as described below: 
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
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)0(
0,)()(
0,)()()()(
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ttttx
ttttxBtButAxtx
d
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 (3.15)
with its quadratic performance index 
( ) ++= tt TTfffT tRututQxtxtxQtxJ 0 )()()()(21)()(21  (3.16)
where nRx ∈ and mRu ∈ are the state and the control functions, respectively. Matrices BA,
and 1B are constant with appropriate dimensions. Also let )(tφ  be a given initial vector 
function, 0X be an initial value, dt  be a time delay and a positive integer, nnRQ ×∈  is a 
positive semi-definite matrix and mmRR ×∈  is a positive definite matrix. The optimal 
control problem is to find the optimal control )(tu ∗ , which minimizes the performance 
index (3.16) and is subject to the system dynamic described in (3.15). 
In accordance with the Pontryagin’s maximum principle, the optimal condition is 
obtained as the following nonlinear TPBVP containing time-delay and time-advance 
terms: 
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where 
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Hence, the optimal control law can be stated as: 
)()( 1 tBRtu T λ−∗ −=  (3-19)
Since it is quite difficult to solve such a problem approximating solutions of the two-
point boundary-valued problems (TPBVP) in (3.17) or finding a solution that will 
produce, a suboptimal control will be sought. Hence, the HPM will be considered the 
method to solve the TPBVP described in (3.17); details will follow. 
3.2.2 Proposed Method 
The model in (3.17) has both time-delay and time-advance terms. A new method based 
on HPM is introduced; it will generate a linear sequence of inhomogeneous TPBVP with 
no delay and advance in the state and co-state variables. To show the basic idea of this 
method, let us define an operator F  in (3.20a) for )(0 df ttt −≤≤ , and in (3.20b) for 
fdf tttt ≤≤− )( : 
0
)()()()(
)()()()(
))(),((
1
1
1
=



++++−
−−++−
=
−
Δ
d
T
T
d
ttBtAtQxt
tBBRttxBtAxtx
ttxF
λλλ
λ
λ 

 (3.20a)
0
)()()(
)()()()(
))(),((
1
1
=



++−
−−++−
=
−
Δ
tAtQxt
tBBRttxBtAxtx
ttxF
T
T
d
λλ
λλ 

 (3.20b)
Now let us separate the operator F into two parts: 
))(),(())(),(())(),(( ttxNttxLttxF λλλ +=  (3.21)
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here, L  and N  represent linear and nonlinear terms, respectively. 
Based on (3.21), the Homotopy technique presented in [67] can be written as the 
following:  
0)),(),,(()),(),,(()),,(),,(( =+= ptptxPFptptxQLPptptxH λλλ  (3.22)
which is equivalent to: 
0)),(),,(()),(),,(()),,(),,(( =+= ptptxPNptptxLPptptxH λλλ  (3.23)
where 
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
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q
q
Q
0
0 , pq −=1 , 


=
p
p
P
0
0  and ]10[∈p  is an embedding parameter, which is 
named the Homotopy parameter. Thus, in a way that agrees with Homotopy equations in 
(3.23), the perturbed vectors of ),( ptx and ),( ptλ  become as follows: 
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Obviously from (3.24) we have: 
0)),(),,(()0),,(),,(( == ptptxLptptxH λλ  (3.25a)
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while p  varies in the span of [0, 1], the solution of linear parts of )(ˆ tx and )(ˆ tλ , as in 
(3.25a), moves to the exact answers of )(tx  and )(tλ as in (3.25b). In topology, it is called 
“deformation.” A detailed illustration on choosing linear operators is displayed in [68].  
In regard to the problem, two operators are selected, as follows: 
(1) Linear operator: 
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(2) Nonlinear operator: 
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Here, the embedded parameter p  is used as a small parameter. The solutions of (3.20a) 
and (3.20b) can be expressed as a power series of p .  
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Setting 1=p  in the above series yields: 
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Substituting (3.28) into (3.20a) and (3.20b), we have: 
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From (3.30), we rearrange the expression based on the order of P . 
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Solving all of the above linear time-invariant problems in a recursive manner leads to 
)(txn and )(tnλ for all 0≥n . However, by making (3.29), we can find )(ˆ txn and )(
ˆ tnλ
,which are the approximation of the exact answer. Therefore, the optimal control law can 
be expressed in the form below: 
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T tBRtu λ  (3.32) 
Theorem 2.1. (Sufficient condition of convergence) 
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Suppose that X  and Y  are two Banach spaces; define a contractive nonlinear: 
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where N  is mapping X  to Y that 
uuuNuNuu ~)~()(;~, −≤−∀ γ (3.34) 
where u and u~  are members of X , and γ  is between 0 and 1. 
Based on Banach’s fixed point theorem, the contractive nonlinear (3-34) has a unique 
fixed point  U  which 
UUN =)( (3.35)
The following sequence can be generated based on the HPM: 
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Suppose that )(00 uBuU t∈=  where { }],[)( 0 ft tttuuXuuB ∈<−∈= ∗∗  and then we have: 
)(uBU tn ∈  (3-37)
uU n
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Proof.  
Let 1=n  in (3.36) from (3.35), so then we have: 
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uuuNUNuU −≤−=− 001 )()( γ (3-39)
For 1−= nn , assume uuuU nn −≤− −− 011 γ  as an induction hypothesis. Then: 
.)()( 011 uuuUuNUNuU
n
nnn −≤−≤−=− −− γγ  (3-40)
Using (3.40), we have: 
ttuuuU nnn ≤≤−≤− γγ 0  (3.41) 
Equation (3.41) concludes that )(uBU tn ∈ , which is proved by Equation (3.37). 
From (3.40), we found that uuuU nn −≤− 0γ . Since 0lim =
∞→
n
n
γ , there is 0lim =−
∞→
uUnn , 
where uU nn =∞→lim . 
3.2.3 Suboptimal Control  
Since it is impossible to find the control law from an infinite series as described in (19), 
finite series must be found.  To keep the first few terms in (19), we have the thk -order 
suboptimal control law as described by  
.)()(
0
)(1 
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k
n
nT
k tBRtu λ  (3.42) 
Here the value of k can be decided based on the precision required. 
With the suboptimal control law described in (3.42), the quadratic performance index can 
be calculated by using 
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( ) ++= ft kTkTfffTk tRututQxtxtxQtxJ 0 )()()()(21)()(21  (3.43) 
where )(tx is the corresponding state trajectory obtained by applying )(tuk  to the original 
nonlinear system in (3.15) with )()( 00 ttx φ= . The process stops if we meet the condition 
.1 ε<− −kk JJ  (3.44) 
If the error bound 0>ε  is chosen small enough, then the  thk -order suboptimal control 
law in (3.42) will be very close to the optimal control law )(* tu , the value of 
performance index kJ  will be very close to its optimal value 
*J , and the boundary 
condition will also be satisfied. 
Algorithm of Finding Suboptimal Control Law 
Step 1: Construct Homotopy as described in (3.22), (3.23) and (3.24), and estimate the 
initial approximations. 
Step 2: Substitute equation (3.28) and (3.29) into (3.23) and (3.24), and arrange them 
with respect to the order of p . 
Step 3: Let 0=j . 
Step 4: Make the coefficients of jp  be zero and solve the resulted linear TPBVP. 
Step 5: Let kj = and calculate the thk order suboptimal control law )()( tu k  according    to 
(3.28). Then, this control law is applied to the nonlinear system as described by 
(3.16) to corresponding state trajectory )(txi and the cost function kJ  using to 
(3.29). 
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Step 6: If the improvement satisfies ε<−
−1kk JJ , which ε  is the selected threshold, a 
sufficiently small positive parameter, go to Step 7. 
Step 7: Increment j by 1, then go to Step 5. 
Step 8: Stop.  
3.2.4 Numerical Example 
Nonlinear oscillators usually described by a set of nonlinear ordinary differential 
equations play an important role in high technologies such as biology, mechanics, optics, 
and particularly in electronic circuits. To show the high accuracy and efficiency of the 
proposed method, the developed method is applied to a harmonic oscillator with retarded 
damping. [69]  
Consider the problem: 
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with the given initial conditions 
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The quadratic cost function to be minimized is described by: 
+= 2
0
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1 )(2
1)2(5 dttuxJ  (3.47) 
To show the validation of the proposed method, first, let the delay be zero, i.e., 0=dt . 
The results from the proposal method are shown in Figures 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11.  And the 
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value of the cost function of this harmonic oscillator design with the collocation method 
is 2.2637=J  and the value J  is 2.2632 after 5 iterations with the proposed method. To 
further investigate the efficiency of this method, the amount of delay dt  is increased in 
the state and the performance of the system is simulated.  The calculated control input 
)(tu  to the system with 2.0,1.0=dt , and 0.3 are given in Figures 3.12, 3.15, and 3.18, 
respectively.  The corresponding state trajectories, )(1 tx  and )(2 tx , for the different delay 
values are shown in Figures 3.13 and 3.14, 3.16 and 3.17, and 3.19 and 3.20. The values 
of the cost function for three different values of delay are shown in Table 3.2.  
 
Figure 3.9: Suboptimal Control Law )0.0( =dt  
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Figure 3.10: Suboptimal State Trajectory x1 )0.0( =dt  
 
Figure 3.11: Optimal State Trajectory x2 )0.0( =dt  
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Figure 3.12: Suboptimal Control Law )1.0( =dt  
 
Figure 3.13: Suboptimal State Trajectory x1 )1.0( =dt  
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Figure 3.14: Suboptimal State Trajectory x2 )1.0( =dt  
 
Figure 3.15: Suboptimal Control Law )2.0( =dt  
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Figure 3.16: Suboptimal State Trajectory x1 )2.0( =dt  
 
Figure 3.17: Suboptimal State Trajectory x2 )2.0( =dt  
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Figure 3.18: Suboptimal Control Law )3.0( =dt  
 
Figure 3.19: Suboptimal State Trajectory x1 )3.0( =dt  
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Figure 3.20: Suboptimal State Trajectory x2 )3.0( =dt  
 
Table 3.2: Cost Function Values for Different Delays of Different Iterations 
Case 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 0.0=dt 6.7164 3.7865 2.3043 2.2683 2.2632 
2 1.0=dt  6.7164 2.4886 1.4711 1.4658 1.4412 
3 2.0=dt  6.7164 1.2246 0.7146 0.6245 0.5916 
4 3.0=dt 6.7164 0.2878 0.1213 0.1212 0.1211 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the importance of time-delay in ICSs was shown. First, the natural time-
delay effect of an SVPWM-based switching pattern for grid-connected three-phase current 
source inverter was studied. An algorithm to track the time delay in real-time to overcome 
the effect of time-delay produced in sensing loop was proposed. This guarantees 
synchronization between grid phase and inverter output. Also, the observer state feedback 
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controller was applied to overcome the effect of time-delay in the control signal.  The 
experimental results clearly show that the proposed approach can compensate the effect of 
time delay and improve quality of output inverter signal. 
Then, the effect of ignoring natural time delay in optimal control design was shown. To 
optimize linear, time-delay control systems, an efficient iterative method is offered based 
on the HPM to determine the optimal control law in the form of infinite series with easy 
computable terms. Despite other famous methods such as the SAA and Sensitivity 
Approach (SA), this method avoids the difficulty of solving a sequence of linear time-
varying TPBVPs of solving directly the nonlinear TPBVP or the HJB equation. Instead it 
only needs solving a sequence of linear time-invariant TPBVPs, which is more practical 
than the above-mentioned approximate methods in aspect of computational complexity. 
This section shows clearly that time-delay is really important in design of optimal 
controller. Ignoring small value of time-delay can significantly change result of optimal 
controller cost function. It was found that dealing with systems with time delays is 
difficult; hence, this is the reason that most researchers ignore delays in the controller 
design process.  
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CHAPTER 4                                                                                     
TIME-DELAY SWITCH ATTACK ON NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS 
4.1 Introduction 
Networked control systems are constantly being modernized by introducing new 
telecommunication technologies for control and monitoring to improve efficiency, 
reliability and sustainability.  This modernization effort relies on computers and multi-
purpose networks, but causes these systems to be vulnerable to cyber attacks and greatly 
impacts people’s lives and affects the economy.     
Consider for instance, U.S. power networks; they operate with supervisory control and 
data acquisition (SCADA) systems.  SCADA systems are industrial control systems for 
large scale processes that include multiple sites and operate over long distances. Despite 
the precautions, several cyber attacks on SCADA systems have been reported [1, 2, 70-
73]. Furthermore, replacing proprietary communication networks with open 
communication standards causes the process control and SCADA systems to become 
vulnerable to cyber security risks [74]. 
In general, an intruder performing an attack could access the IT infrastructure of ICSs, 
gain access to various sensors and control signals, and manipulate them to disrupt and 
sabotage the system. For example, an intruder can increase a load on a particular power 
transformer, shut down sections of a control system, or introduce inefficiencies in the 
system and the plant [9, 12, 13, 75]. 
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Investigating the methods of attacks on ICSs of sensitive infrastructures, devising 
measures, and security control protocols have attracted the attention of academia and 
industries. These industries’ efforts have ended in a large amount of literature and in the 
production of hardware and software systems dedicated to security measures that prevent 
possible attacks on industrial systems. An attack called the “time-delay-switch attack” or 
“TDS” for short in the NCS introduced in this section. This attack can be aimed at 
different parts of NCS and cause inefficiency or stability issues in the system.  
In this chapter, TDS attacks are introduced and how this type of attack can be injected into 
a NCS by a hacker is discussed. Then,  the impact of introducing time delays in the 
sensing loop (SL) or in the Automatic Generation Control (AGC) signal, which is the only 
automatic closed loop between the IT and the power system on a control area, is 
discussed. When a hacker introduces delays in a control system, they are performing a 
time-delay-switch attack (TDS). The effects of this attack on another application related to 
the biomedical industry were also studied. This chapter also details how a TDS attack can 
cause any control system to become unstable. Therefore, future NCSs will have to use an 
advanced two-way communication and design new controllers to provide a better 
situational awareness of the state of a system, keeping NCS reliable and safe from TDS 
attacks. 
4.2 TDS Attack Model on NCS 
A time-delay switch attack can be injected into different parts of a NCS. It can be 
injected into the feedback line (signal transmitted from the plant output to the controller), 
 53 
 
the referenced signal, and the control signal in Figure 4.1, respectfully.  Here, a TDS 
attack on the feedback line is addressed. 
 
Figure 4.1: Different Places that TDS Attacks can be Injected 
Consider a general LTI system, described as follows: 
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 (4.1)
where x  and y  are state and output vectors, u  is the control signal and 0x  is the initial 
state value.  Also A , B , C  and D are constant matrices with appropriate dimensions.  
The controller is described as: 
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)(yhU =  (4.2)
where y is the information communicated to the controller about the plant’s state. The 
function, h , describes the plant’s output and communication methodology.  
An attack on the control system involves altering any component of the NCS. A general 
attack can be described as a function that alters any of the components of the system: 
),,,,,,,()~,~,~,~,~,~,~,~( tuyxDCBAtuyxDCBA Λ=  (4.3)
where )~,~,~,~,~,~,~,~( tuyxDCBA  are the corrupted functions as a result of the attack Λ. The 
TDS attack can be modeled as follows: 
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t
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~  (4.5)
where τ   is function of t  and is a random variable time-delay that is always less than 
time t . 
4.3 TDS Attacks in Communication Systems 
An illustration of a TDS attack on a NCS through a simplified version of Figure 4.1 is 
shown in Figure 4.2. The plant is a power-area system controlled by the load frequency 
controller. The x(t) is a vector of the state of power area, and is measured and transmitted 
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to the controller via communication lines. The u (t) is the control signals, r(t) is the 
desired state, and e(t) is the difference between the desired state and the measured plant 
state. The intruder attacks the communication line between the plant and controller either 
by dropping the packets or delaying them. The plant (P) sends the state variables, x(t), as 
information packets to the TDS attack variants. 
Controller Control Signal Plant Output Signal
SenderNetwork
(Wired/ Wireless)
Receiver
Error+
Reference 
Signal
)(tx)(tu
)(tr
Attacker
)(te
 
Figure 4.2: A Simplified NCS System under a TDS Attack 
Replay TDS Attack. The attacker leaves the first message x(0.1) intact. Then, it records 
and drops the second message, x(0.2), and resends in its place the first message. 
Subsequently, it sends x(0.2) instead of the third message, etc. The attacker can 
generalize this attack by introducing different time delays. Table 4.1 illustrates the steps 
of this attack where the attacker adds a delay of 0.1 sec. In the table, “TS” denotes the 
timestamp. 
Table 4.1: Scenario 1, Sequence of Events During a Replay TDS Attack 
TS {TS, P(t)} {TS, C(t)} Controller Input (e(t)) 
0.1 )}1.0(,1.0{ x )}1.0(,1.0{ x )1.0()1.0( xr −  or 0 
0.2 )}2.0(,2.0{ x )}1.0(,1.0{ x )1.02.0()2.0( −− xr or 0 
0.3 )}3.0(,3.0{ x )}2.0(,2.0{ x )1.03.0()3.0( −− xr  or 0 
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Timestamp-based TDS Attack. The attacker reconstructs the packet, and fixes the 
timestamp.   In this way, the timestamping detector is not able to find the time-delay 
attack. The attacker receives the first message from the plant, and copies the value in the 
buffer. Then, it substitutes the state value of the first packet inside the second message, 
and reconstructs the packet. Then, it sends the packet to the controller. Table 4.2 
illustrates this scenario. In this table, x1 denotes the first state value, x2 the second state 
value, and so forth. Let us say that the plant sends x2 at 0.2 sec, and attacker copies it. 
Now, consider that the controller get x3 at 0.3 sec. At this time, the attacker sends x2 
instead of x3 with a corrected 0.3 time stamp. This can happen even on encrypted 
scenarios if the attacker can decrypt the packet and reconstruct it with the new wrong 
state, and correct the time stamps. 
Table 4.2: Scenario 2, Sequence of Events During Timestamps Alter TDS Attack 
TS {TS, P(t)} {TS, C(t)} Controller Input 
0.1 )}1.0(,1.0{ 1x )}1.0(,1.0{ 1x )1.0()1.0( 11 xr −
0.2 )}2.0(,2.0{ 2x
 
)}2.0(,2.0{ 1x
)1.02.0()2.0(
)2.0()2.0(
22
12
−−=
−
xr
xr
 
0.3 )}3.0(,3.0{ 3x
 
)}3.0(,3.0{ 2x
)1.03.0()3.0(
)3.0()3.0(
33
23
−−=
−
xr
xr
 
 
Noise-based TDS Attack. The attacker injects fake packages into the system, making the 
system add the delay to the transmission of system packages. In this way, the packets 
from the plant are delivered to the controller with the delay. 
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4.4 Sabotage and Destabilizing Analysis of TDS Attack 
4.4.1 Theoretical Analysis 
Before commencing the proof of the destabilizing effects of TDS attacks, the 
assumptions and definitions are examined.   
An assumption of approximation is made of the NCS by a linear time-invariant (LTI) 
system. Also, an assumption is made that the controller is the optimal controller with 
optimal gain K. This can be easily extended for other types of controllers. This 
dissertation focuses on the optimal controller in most of the applications, as these types of 
controllers are more sensitive to TDS attacks. 
Let h be defined by the following (also shown in Figure 4.3): 


>
≤
=
a
a
tt
tt
h
1
0  (4.6)
Then, the NCS controller under a TDS attack can be written as: 
[ ]dhxxhKyKu +−−=−= )1(~  (4.7)
where )( dd ttxx −= , at  is the start time of the attack. 
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Figure 4.3: Step Function, h(t) 
 
It is obvious that the system is stable for all ݐ ≤ ݐ௔ by definition of the optimal controller. 
However, for ݐ > ݐ௔ it is not obvious whether or not the system would be stable. 
Theorem: The system described in (4.1) under attack (4.7) is not efficient for any delay
0>dt , and can be unstable for large values of delay. 
Theorem 4-1: 
Applying (4.7) to (4.1) results in: 
( )dXhXhBKAXX +−−= )1(  (4.8)
Let us write (4.8) as: 
)()( dXXhBKXBKAX −+−=  (4.9)
Define )( BKAG −=
Δ
. G is a negative definite, since the system is stable without the attack. 
Then, Equation (4.9) is written as: 
dhBKXXhBKGX −+= )(  (4.10) 
Now, let us integrate Equation (4.10): 
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 −−−−+−+ −= t dhtrBKGrhttBKGthttBKGt drhxeBKeXeX aaa 0 )()(0)(  (4.11) 
Suppose att >  and dtt > , such that ttt a ≈−  and 1=h . Then, Equation (4.11) can be 
approximated by: 



−≈  −tt drtAAt a drXeBKXeX )(0  (4.12) 
Since A is a negative definite, then for large t: 



−≈  −tt drtAa drXeBKX )(  (4.13)
Equation (4.13) represents the asymptotic behavior of the system after the attack. The 
Differentiate Equation (4.13) with all constant terms multiplied by Ate : 
)( dttBKXX −−≈  (4.14)
If Equation (4.14) is shifted by td,  the result is 
)()( tBKXttX d −≈+  (4.15)
then:  
)]()([)()( dd ttXtXBKtXttX −−−≈−+   (4.16)
and 
)]2()([)()( ddd ttXttXBKttXtX −−−−≈−−   (4.17)
therefore, 
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 −−−≈−+ t ddd dstsXtsXBKtXttX 02 )2()()()()(   (4.18) 
Equation (4.18) means that as time progresses in increments of td, the derivative of 
difference )()( tXttX d  −+  is growing exponentially in multiples of BK for 1)( >BKeig
. Hence, the system is unstable.  
Proof 4-2: Consider a scenario where a hacker injects a TDS attack for a period of time. 
In order to show that TDS attacks can destabilize the systems, the following proof is used 
for the hybrid system. Before commencing the proof, an assumption is made that the 
system can be approximated by a linear time-invariant (LTI) system, and its optimal 
controller has the form ).()( tKxtu −=  
When under a TDS attack, the control can be described as: 



≥−
≤<−−
≤−
=
b
ba
a
tttxK
ttttxK
tttxK
tu
)(
)(
)(
)( τ  (4.19) 
where τ  is a set of random time delays, at  is the start time of attack, and bt  is the end 
time of an attack. It is obvious that the system is stable for all att ≤  and maybe stable for 
btt ≥  by the definition of the optimal controller. However, for ba ttt ≤<  it is not obvious 
that the system would be stable. 
Theorem 4-2: Without loss of generality, we suppose ∞=bt . Then we consider the 
system described in (4.1) with an attack described by (4.19). The system under attack is 
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not stable if the hybrid dynamic model of system has at least one positive eigenvalue or at 
least one pole in the Right Half Plane (RHP). 
Proof:   
By applying (4.19) to (4.1) for att < , we obtain: 
)()()( tBKxtAxtx −= (4.20)
where its characteristic equation is: 
0)( =−− BKAsI (4.21)
Solving (4.21) for  “ s ”  provides the eigenvalues of the system before an attack.  
For att > , the system is described by: 
)()()( τ−−= tXBKtAXtX  (4.22)
Taking the Laplace transform from the above equation, we obtain 
)()()( sXBKesAXssX sτ−−=  (4.23)
Let stetX =)(  be a proposed solution of (4.22), followed by 
stsstst eBKeAeIse τ−−= . (4.24)
Here,  “ s ”  must satisfy the characteristic equation of the delay system (4.22), i.e. 
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0)( =−− − τsBKeAsI . (4.25)
In order to keep the system in the same stable situation as before the attack, the new 
eigenvalues should be at the same place as the eigenvalues right before the attack. So 
from (4.21) and (4.25), we obtain  
IIeIeIBK ss ==+− −− ττ 0)( . (4.26)
Equation (4.26) is satisfied if and only if 0=τ . Then, we can conclude for 0>τ , and the 
system (4.9) will be disturbed for those subspaces (time delays), where for larger time 
delays, the system will be unstable.  
4.4.2 TDS Attack on Load Frequency Control in Smart Grid 
In this section, the focus is on the impact of introducing time delays in the SL or in the 
AGC signal--the only automatic closed loop between the IT and the power system on a 
control area. When a hacker chooses to introduce delays in a control system, they are 
performing a Time-Delay-Switch attack (TDS). The research in this dissertation will 
show how TDS attacks can make any control system, in particular, a power control 
system, unstable. Therefore, future smart grids will use advanced two-way 
communication and artificial intelligence technologies to provide better situational 
awareness of power grid states, keeping smart grids reliable and safe from FDI, DOS or 
TDS attacks. While these technologies will facilitate the aggregation and communication 
of both system-wide information and local measurement, they will also have their own 
cyber security challenges. 
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It is reasonable to model a power system under a TDS attack as a hybrid system, by 
formulating TDS attacks as a switch action “Off/Delay-by-td,” where td is a random delay 
time, of sensed system states or control signals of a power system. A TDS attack on the 
power Load Frequency Control (LFC) system is used as an example. Consider a two-area 
power system with an automatic gain control under attack in Figure 4.4 [13]. The LFC 
sends a control signal and is updated through communication channels from/to the 
turbine and from the telemeter’s measurements for RTUs. The communication channels 
are either wireless networks or wired. 
 
Figure 4.4: Two-area Power System with LFC under a TDS Attack 
 
Attacks can be launched by jamming the communication channels (i.e., DOS attack), by 
distorting feedback signals (e.g., FDI attack), or by injecting delays (i.e., TDS attack) into 
the data from telemeter measurements. LFC controllers are usually designed as an 
optimal feedback controller.  However, for the LFC controller to operate optimally,  it 
requires real-time power states to be telemetered with negligible delays to the controllers. 
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Hence, sensors, communication protocols, and channels must be reliable and fast enough 
to guarantee optimal operation. Now, if a hacker introduces delays in the telemetered 
control signals or the measured states, then the LFC system will deviate from optimality, 
and in most cases, break down.  
Model of Load Frequency Control under TDS Attack 
Consider a two-area power plant with the automatic gain control under attack in Figure 
4.4. The load frequency controller sends control signals to the plant and gets state 
feedback through the communication channels from the turbines and measurements for 
Remote Terminal Units (RTUs). The communication channels are wireless networks. 
Attacks can be launched by jamming the communication channels (i.e., DOS attack [12]), 
by distorting feedback signals (e.g., FDI attack [76]), or by injecting delays (i.e., TDS 
attack [77]) into data coming from telemeter measurements.  
The LFC is usually designed as an optimal feedback controller, but in order for it to 
operate optimally, it requires power state estimation to be telemetered in real time. If a 
hacker introduces significant time delays in the telemetered control signals or measured 
states, the LFC will deviate from its optimality, and in most cases, the system will break 
down. A LFC power system was modeled as being under a TDS attack as a hybrid 
system in a switch action “Off/Delay-by-τ,” where τ is some delay time of the sensed 
system state or the control signals.  
A portion of the LFC multi-area interlock power system is shown, as described in [78]. 
More details can be found in [13]. The LFC dynamic model for the thi  area is given by 
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
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)),(()()()(
 (4.27)
where 5Rx∈  and 5Ru∈ are the state and the control vectors, respectively. The model of 
the thi  area is influenced by the thj  power area. Matrices iiA and iB  are constant matrices 
with suitable dimensions, and ilPΔ  is the power deviation of the load. The initial state 
vector is denoted by ix0  for the thi  power area. Then the state vector is defined as 
Tii
pf
i
tu
i
g
ii ttPtPtPtftx ])()()()()([)( ΛΔΔΔΔ=  (4.28)
where ifΔ , igPΔ , ituPΔ , ipfPΔ  and iΛ are frequency deviation, power deviation of the 
generator, position value of the turbine, tie-line power flow and control error on the thi  
power area, respectively [19]. The control error of the thi  power area is expressed as 
 Δ=Λ t iii dssft
0
)()( β  (4.29)
where iβ  denotes the frequency bias factor. 
In the dynamic model of the LFC, iiA , iB , and )),(( ilj Ptxh Δ are represented as 
















−−
−
−−
=

=
≠
1000
00002
00101
00110
0101
1
i
N
j
ji
ij
igigi
ituitu
iii
i
ii
T
TT
TT
JJJ
A
β
π
ω
μ
 (4.30) 
 66 
 
T
ig
i T
B




= 00100  (4-31) 
i
li
j
N
j
ji
ij
i
l
j PDtxAPtxh Δ+=Δ 
=
≠
)()),((
1
 (4-32) 
where N  is the total number of power areas, iJ , iω , iμ , igT  and ituT  are the generator 
moment of inertia, the speed-droop coefficient, generator damping coefficient, the 
governor time constant, the turbine time constant in the thi  power area and ijT is the 
stiffness constant between the thi  and the thj  power areas, respectively. Also we have 
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and, 
T
i
i J
D 


−= 00001  (4.34)
Equation (4.35) gives the extension of the dynamic model (4.27) to the multi-area power 
system with the attack model using Equations (4.30), (4.31), (4.32), (4.33) and (4.34). 
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PDtBUtAXtX l  (4.35)
where 
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[ ]TN txtxtxtX )()()()( 21 =  (4.36) 
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[ ] }{ 321 TTNTTT BBBBdiagB =  (4.37b)
[ ] }{ 321 TTNTTT DDDDdiagD =  (4.37c)
where B and D are 5N×5N matrices. 
The optimal feedback controller is given by 
KXU −= (4.38)
where optimal gain K is a 5N×N matrix, the control signal and state signal are 5N×5N 
matrixes.  
The design of the optimal controller for the LFC system in the normal operation (i.e., 
with no attack) involves minimizing a cost function described as 
dttRUtUtQXtXJ T
t
T
f
)}()()()({
2
1
0
+=   (4.39)
where the matrix NNQ 55 ×ℜ∈  is positive semi-definite and NNR 55 ×ℜ∈  is a positive definite.  
Then, the optimal control problem is to obtain an optimal control signal )(tU that 
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minimizes the performance index (4.39), which is subject to the dynamic of the system 
with no time-delay in its states.  
The system with the optimal controller is described by the following equation: 


=
Δ+−=
0)0(
)()()(
XX
PDtXBKAtX l  (4.40)
With the time-delay attack, the control signal will be modified by: 
XKU ˆ−=  (4.41)
and the new state after the attack can be modeled by:   
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In (4.42), ...,, 21 dd tt and dNt  can be different/random time delays and are positive values. 
When dNdd ttt ...,,, 21  are all zero, the system is in normal operation. A hacker can gain 
access to the communication link and inject a delay attack on the line to direct the system 
to abnormal operations.  
Remark 1: In this paper, lPΔ  is considered constant. This is a reasonable case, because 
the stability of the power system will not be influenced by an appropriate period 
following a step load change [13].  
This section analyzes TDS attack effects; in the upcoming chapters, the robust controller 
is proposed in the face of this attack. At this point, an optimal controller in normal 
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operation (with no attack) is designed, and then the system  is attacked with an on/off 
switch SW  and  the behavior of the system experiencing a TDS attack is analyzed.  
The optimal control problem is to obtain optimal control )(* tU , which minimizes the 
performance index (4.39), and is subject to the dynamic system described in (4.35) with 
no time-delay in state. 
Simulation studies were conducted to evaluate the effects of TDS attacks on the 
dynamics of the system. The optimal control law can be found for the system in its 
normal operation. For simplicity of discussion, 2=N is set, which is defined as a two-area 
power system.  Table 4.3 shows the parameter values used in this process. Since 
simulation on a certain duration tracks a step load change, we also set 1lPΔ and 02 =Δ lP .  
Then, the instability of the system can be studied by finding the eigenvalues of the system 
before and after the attack. Roots (zeros) of (4.42) determine the stability of the system. 
For simulation simplicity, the fifth order Pade approximation [79] was used to 
approximate τse − . 
Table 4.3: Parameter Values for Two-Area Power System  
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
1J  10  1ω 05.0  
1μ  5.1  1gT s12.0  
1tuT  s2.0  2tuT s45.0  
12T  radpu /198.0 21T radpu /198.0  
2J  12 2ω 05.0  
2μ  1 2gT s18.0  
R  I100  fQ 0  
Q  I100  ft ∞
1β  5.21  2β 21
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Figure 4.5 shows the results of the system’s eigenvalues before and after different TDS 
attacks. As τ tends to be larger than zero, the eigenvalues move from the LHP to the 
RHP. It clearly shows that the system becomes unstable for time delays larger than
sec3.0=τ . In Figure 4.5, the crosses, points, circles and stars denote the eigenvalues of 
the system with no attack and attacks with the time delays sec1.0=τ , sec4.0=τ and 
sec6.0=τ , respectfully. Figure 4.6 shows the maximum eigenvalue track based on 
different time-delay values. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 clearly show that the system becomes 
unstable when the delay value increases.  
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Figure 4.5: Eigenvalues of the System for Normal Operation and Attack by Different Time Delays 
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Figure 4.6: Maximum Eigenvalues for Different Time-delay Attacks 
The total simulation time is 40 sec, and the hacker has access to switch SW  in Figure 4.4 
and starts the TDS attack with [ ]Tdndd ttt 21=τ . In Figure 4.7, the graphs (a), (b), (c) 
and (d) show the simulation results of the frequency deviation, the power deviation of the 
generator, the value position of the turbine and the tie-line power flow, respectively. 
Case 1:  
The hacker attacks all of the states at sta 15= , with the same time-delay pattern. In 
Figure 4.7 (a), (b), (c) and (d), the black lines show normal operation. TDS attacks 1 and 
2 denote time-delay attacks with td1=0.4, td2=0.4,…, td2=0.4 seconds and with td1=0.6, 
td2=0.6, …, td2=0.6 seconds, respectively. It is clear that the system moves into an 
unstable region as it is attacked. 
Case 2: 
The attack starts at time sta 5= , and the hacker attacks only one state of the system. In 
Figure 4.8, in graphs (a), (b), (c) and (d), TDS attacks 1 and 2 denote attacks with a time 
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delay of 6.01 =dt  and 11 =dt , respectively (this means that there is no time-delay attack for 
other states). In the case of a TDS attack at 3.01 =dt , the system is disturbed but is still 
stable.  
The results of Case 1 and Case 2 conclude that the hacker can cause system instability 
just by attacking one state of the system.  
This section considers TDS attacks, a new type of attack on the cyber layer of smart grids 
that can sabotage the dynamic performance of power systems. The LFC power system 
experiencing a TDS attack is modeled as hybrid systems, and the TDS attacks are 
formulated as switch action “Off/Delay-by-τ” sensing channels or control inputs. Then, 
the destabilizing action of TDS attacks on power systems was studied using methods 
from hybrid system theories. A two-area LFC LTI model was simulated to evaluate the 
effects of TDS attacks. The results show that TDS attacks affect the dynamic 
performance of the LFC system, and in many cases, could destroy the system’s stability, 
which can be launched at any time during the operation of the power system. In the 
following chapters, the focus is on attempts to make controllers and communication 
protocols robust under this type of attack.  
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           (a)                   (b) 
          (c) (d) 
Figure 4.7: Case 1, (a) Frequency Deviation, KfΔ , (b) Power Deviation of Generator, KgPΔ , (c) Value 
Position of the Turbine, KtuPΔ , (d) Tie-line Power Flow, 
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            (a)              (b)  
 
            (c)              (d) 
Figure 4.8: Case 2, (a) Frequency Deviation KfΔ , (b) Power Deviation of Generator KgPΔ , (c) Value 
Position of the Turbine KtuPΔ , (d) Tie-line Power Flow 
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4.4.3. TDS Attack on Peace Maker, an Application in Biomedical Systems 
There are many analyses and design techniques developed for  LTI systems [80, 81]. 
However, for a nonlinear system that could possibly be time-varying, one needs a 
nonlinear control methodology. A major part of a nonlinear control theory studies how to 
extend the well-known linear methods to nonlinear systems.   
One of the most complex but robust nonlinear systems is the human heart. An 
electrocardiogram (ECG) records potential differences between two electrodes located on 
the skin at predetermined positions on the chest to measure the electrical activities in 
cardiac tissue. A solitary cycle of an ECG consists of the activities of relaxation and 
contraction of the heart (called “heart pumping actions”). One can identify an ECG signal 
by its P, Q, R, S, and T peaks, PR and ST segments, PR and QT intervals, and QRX 
complex. Characteristic information obtained from an ECG can be used to assess cardiac 
health and identify potential heart problems. For example, important information 
extracted from an ECG recording is the time between successive R-peaks, which is an 
RR-interval. The changeability of the series of RR-intervals, known as heart rate 
variability (HRV), is being used to measure heart functions, such as: identifying a 
patient’s risk for cardiovascular failure [82], as “an indicator for mortality following 
myocardial infarction” [83], and as a measure of the contacts between different control 
mechanisms of physiology, like respiratory sinus arrhythmia.  
The development of mathematical models of the heartbeat (ECG) with appropriate 
PQRST peaks, QRX complex, (PR, ST) segments, (PR, QT) intervals and HRV spectra 
has been and continues to be the subject of wide investigations with varying degrees of 
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successes. A successful ECG model becomes a valuable tool for analyzing the various 
effects of physiological conditions of the outlines of the ECG and for the assessment of 
diagnostic ECG signal processing devices.  
The type of ECG signal is the result of the propagation of electrical activities in the 
myocardium, and the HRV is the result of physiological and neurological controls. In 
1972, Zeeman presented a set of nonlinear dynamical equations for heartbeat modeling 
[84, 85] based on the Van der Pol-Lienard equation. These models are based on  
pacemaking generated by the Sino-Atrial (SA) node, which is the dominant pacemaker, 
compared with the slower one produced by the Atrio-Ventricular (AV) junction. 
Furthermore, these models did not take into consideration the sympathetic and 
parasympathetic modulations responsible for HRV generation [86]. 
In [87], the Zeeman’s 2nd-order ordinary differential equation (ODE) of the heartbeat 
model was modified by incorporating a switch (on/off) control variable demonstrating the 
pacemaker’s mechanism of the contraction-relaxation for the heart. Subsequently, 
Jafarnia-Dabanloo et al. in 2007 [88] modified the 3rd-order nonlinear Zeeman model by 
adding control parameters that affect the frequency of the oscillation to control the HRV 
by using a neural network to produce the ECG signal.  
Yet another well-known approach to model the cardiac rhythms is based on the Van der 
Pol oscillators. In contrast to the Zeeman models, the coupled Van der Pol oscillator 
models at AV node have a more active role in pace making [89]. This model allows us to 
consider the effect of the coupling between the SA and the AV pacemakers in normal 
electrophysiological dynamics.  
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In this section, the stability of the heartbeat model that was developed by Zeeman [84] is 
examined. This model captures, at least qualitatively, three essential characteristics of 
cardiac dynamics: (i) a stable equilibrium, (ii) a threshold for triggering the action 
potential, and (iii) a return to equilibrium. The model consists of a 2nd-order nonlinear 
ODE of the Liénard-type representing the heartbeat dynamics [90]. 
In this era of pervasive communication technology, distant monitoring and follow-up of 
patients implanted with pacemakers (PMs) and implantable cardioverter-defibrillators 
(ICDs) is becoming very common. Most companies fit PMs and ICDs with wireless 
capability that communicates information to home transmitters, then to physicians. These 
systems are widely used in the U.S. and are being introduced in Europe. Only recently, a 
tiny wireless pacemaker was launched in Europe by Nanostim [91]. The security of 
current and future biomedical devices is going to draw a major concern of public health 
in the future. Recently, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security underscored some 
threats affecting almost 300 medical devices [92, 93]. The latest technology in wireless 
pacemakers [91] makes them vulnerable to hackers that can gain access to and sabotage 
such medical devices. Attacks such as false data injection, denial of service and other 
types of attacks can make lives that depend on wireless enabled devices such as 
pacemakers difficult and dangerous. Therefore, it is reasonable to model the heartbeat 
pacemaker system under time-delay-switch (TDS) attacks and provide a possible 
solution. The TDS attack is a switched action “Off/Delay-by-τ,” where τ specifies 
random delay times of the sensed system states or control signals of a system. The TDS 
attack on the heartbeat control system is modeled (Figure 4.9) as a hybrid system. Then, a 
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solution will be provided using an emotional learning control to temper the effects of 
such an attack on the control of heartbeats in Chapter 8.  
The first section of the paper introduces a common nonlinear model of heartbeat, i.e., 
Zeeman models. The stability of the 2nd-order heartbeat model using the indirect method 
is also discussed.  
 
Figure 4.9: Heartbeat Control Model with Possible Control Attack 
Nonlinear Heart Model under TDS Attack 
Based on [84], the second-order nonlinear heartbeat model is provided by: 
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where the states )(1 tX  and )(2 tX  represent the length of a muscle fiber and a state related 
to electrochemical activities, dx  indicates a typical muscle fiber length, ε  is a small 
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positive constant that plays a role in fast eigenvalues of the system, and finally, T  shows 
the tension in the muscle fiber. Parameter values are shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Parameters Value of Model (4.43) 
Parameter dx  T  ε  
value 1.024 1 0.2 
 
Values in Table 4.4 were checked by analyzing the equilibrium point stability using the 
well-known Lyapunov indirect stability theorem [94]. For this purpose, let A  be the 
Jacobian matrix of Equation 1 at the origin.   
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For the parameter 0=dx , the eigenvalues of A  have the values of 618.3  and 382.1 . Both 
are positive and show that the origin is not stable. 
The condition for the real part of the eigenvalue to be negative is 03 21 >− TX . Hence, the 
system can be stable if ,
31
TX ≥ and 
31
TX −≤ . These conditions can be satisfied if the 
value of dx   is 024.1 . For 024.1=dx , the stable equilibrium point is at  )0497.0,024.1( −  in 
the state space. In this case, all of the trajectories, irrespective of their primary conditions, 
move toward the diastolic equilibrium point.  
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The system stays at the stable equilibrium point endlessly, until the equilibrium point is 
stable, except there is an exterior excitation that forces the system to move to a new 
equilibrium point. Based on this new stable system, a control input is added to the system 
(4.43), as shown below: 
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when the heart is in systolic state, sx is an additional parameter representing a typical 
fiber length, and )(tu shows the cardiac pacemaker control mechanism that leads the heart 
into diastolic and systolic states. The feedback controller can be found in the form of: 
XKtu ˆ)( −=  (4.46)
and the new state after the attack (or random delay of feedback line) can be modeled by: 
)(ˆ τ−= tXX  (4.47)
In Equation (4.47), τ  is the time delay and a positive integer. When the time delay is 
zero, the system works in its normal operation. The hacker can access the communication 
line and delay the communication line. This model is true also for the small value of 
delay, which can occur in the nature of the wireless sensor. 
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Stability Simulation and Results 
The 2nd order heartbeat model to track the ECG signal using the PID controller was 
simulated. Then, an external TDS attack was applied to the model from a start time St
until a final time Ft  to show the performance of a classical PID controller. 
Figure 4.10 shows the ECG reference tracking )(2 tX  using the PID under a TDS attack. 
The dashed line shows the PID controller tracking an ECG signal under a TDS attack, 
and the solid line shows the referenced ECG signal [95].  
The TDS attack or feedback delay was applied to the model from sec4.0=St  until 
sec45.0=St with a time delay of s01.0=τ . For the purpose of visual comparison, the attack 
period and the amount of attacks selected were a smaller amount because for a larger 
period and time-delay value, the classical PI controller goes outside the visual 
boundaries.  
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Figure 4.10: Effect of TDS Attack on PID Controller of Heartbeat Model 
Based on the above simulation, it is obvious that TDS attacks can disturb and disable any 
control system. 
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CHAPTER 5                                                                                     
TIME-DELAY SWITCH ATTACK DETECTION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will demonstrate how to detect a TDS attack on Networked Control 
Systems, and particularly in networked power control systems. Time delays injected by a 
hacker in a control system, in general, destabilizes the system or causes inefficiency. This 
is a new attack in the context of control systems (e.g., load frequency control (LFC)) on 
NCSs [93], which is called a “TDS attack.” To avoid the damaging effects of TDS 
attacks, systems and controllers must be redesigned in such a way that it can detect and 
correct variable time delays.  
A varying amount of time delays exist in almost any dynamic system in the sensing and 
control loops. Let us consider power systems for this section. The traditional controllers 
of power systems were designed based on the availabe information ignoring the existance 
of time delays. However, power grids constantly enhance new telecommunication 
technologies for monitoring, and improving the efficiency, reliability, and sustainability 
of supply and distribution. For example, the introduction of a Wide Area Measurement 
System (WAMS) provides synchronized, near real-time measurements in Phase 
Measurement Units (PMUs). WAMS, which are used for stability analysis of power 
systems, can also be used for designing efficient controllers.  Nevertheless, time delays 
are present in PMU measurements as a result of natural transmission lines [96]. 
Several studies considered control systems with time delays [76, 97, 98]. The impact of 
time delay on the power system’s stabilizing controllers was discussed in [99-103]. In 
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[104], the authors studied the effects of delays on the small signal stability of control 
systems. In [99] and [100], methods are  proposed to eliminate oscillations that result 
from time-delayed feedback control. In [105], the authors presented a wide-area control 
system for damping generator oscillations. In [96], a controller was proposed using 
phasor measurements with delays, in which  the small-signal stability of the power 
system was considered. A feedback controller for power systems with delayed states was 
proposed in [106]. The controller deals with the combined effects of the instantaneous as 
well as the delayed states using the quadratic Lyapunov function for systems with delays. 
Additional studies on control systems with delay can be found in [21, 78, 97, 107, 108] 
and the references therein.  However, most of these   studies considered either the 
construction of controllers that are robust to time delays or controllers that use offline 
estimates of time delays. Furthermore, few studies [15, 109] considered the control of 
systems with time delays introduced by hackers.,It is assumed that there are no control 
methods that perform an online estimation of dynamic time delays and real-time control 
of power systems.   
In this section,  a simple yet effective method to address a TDS attack on the observed 
states of a controlled system is described. This method utilizes a time delay estimator, a 
communication protocol to alert for a time-delay switch attack, a buffer to store the 
history of controller commands, an optimal controller to stabilize or track a reference 
signal, and a local to the plant emergency controller to stabilize the plant if long time 
delays are detected. For now, only the LTI systems with state feedback will be examined.  
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5.2 TDS Attack Detection and Real-Time Monitoring Method  
The proposed method is shown in Figure 5.1. Its basic elements are a plant model, a time-
delay detector, a controller, and a computer system. The controller can either be a PID 
controller or an optimal feedback controller. The time-delay detector estimates the time 
delay in the communication channel from telemetered data. If the delay is larger than an 
acceptable time delay, it sends alarm signals to the controller and the emergency 
controller. The results of TDS detectors are used to activate the emergency controller to 
stabilize the system in case of an attack on the communication lines of the distant 
controller. If an alarm signal is received by the emergency controller, it will begin to 
stabilize the plant to a desired state, while the distant controller stops operating until the 
delay is corrected. 
 
Figure 5.1: Block Diagram of Proposed Technique 
Suppose the system used is the linear time invariant (LTI) or can be approximated in a 
region of interest by a LTI system, then it can be described by   
)()()( tButAxtx += , (5.1)
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where x and u  are state and control vectors, respectively. Matrices A and B  are constant 
matrices with suitable dimensions.   
Then, its solution is given by: 
 −+= t stAAt dssBuexetx
0
)(
0 )()( , (5.2)
With time delay τ, due to a time-delay switch attack or any natural delay, the solution 
becomes: 
− −−− +=− τ τττ t stAtA dssBuexetx
0
)(
0
)( )()( . (5.3)
Let us write the solution )(tx  at the time t   as a function of a time-delayed signal: 
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In general, the time delay τ is an unknown variable. The estimation error of the time 
delay is ττε −= ˆ . The predicted state )(ˆ tx of the system based on the estimate of time 
delay τˆ is given by: 
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where )ˆ(ˆ τ−tx  is the estimate of the delayed state given the estimate of the delay τˆ . 
It should be noted that )( τ−tx  is what is actually measured and delivered to the plant 
model. So, at every instance of time, the values of the variables )(ˆ tx , )ˆ(ˆ τ−tx , ݑ(ݐ), and 
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)( τ−tx are known to the controller. On the other hand, the current state )(tx  and the time 
delay τ  are unknown. It is essential that the plant model estimates the state )(tx  
accurately. Because of the delay an accurate estimation of )(tx  requires a good estimate 
of the delay τ, the next step will show how to estimate the delay τ. 
The estimation error in state can be described by )(ˆ)()( txtxtem −= , and with a delay, it is 
given by 
)ˆ(ˆ)()ˆ,;( ττττ −−−= txtxtem . (5.6)
The idea is to estimate τˆ  over time as fast as possible so as to minimize the error 
)ˆ,;( ττtem . To do so, we select 
25.0 mev = . Using the gradient descent method, we set 
,
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where η  is the learning parameter. With some manipulation, we have: 
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Assuming that 0)0( =u , which is reasonable for the initial time, we arrive at: 
txAetBue
dt
d tA
m ≤≤−−−=
− ττητ τ ˆ0,)ˆ(ˆ 0)ˆ(  (5.9)
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Equation (5.9) is used to estimate the time delayτ . This value is sent to both the 
controller and monitoring center to inform them about the occupancy TDS attack in the 
system. The alarm strategy is shown in Figure 5.1. 
This method was implemented in MATLAB to verify its performance using the LFC of a 
two-area distributed power system. In the next section, the simulation results are 
presented and discussed in detail.  
5.3 Simulation Result, TDS Attack Detection on Smart Grid Application 
This section focuses on the LFC system, where the controller’s task is to regulate the 
state of a networked power system. The description of a multi-interconnect LFC dynamic 
system can be found in Section 4.4.2. Here, we focus on a two-area power system with 
the attack model described in the same section (Section 4.2). It should be noted that we 
used the same parameter values as described in Table 4.3. 
The total simulation time is 50 seconds, and the sampling period is 0.01 sec. In order to 
show accuracy of the proposed TDS attack detector, a negative acknowledgment is not 
sent to the local controller for the first simulation. The simulation was performed for 
three different scenarios: (1) single TDS attack on one power area, (2) simultaneous TDS 
attack on both power areas, and (3) complex varied TDS attack on both power areas.  
1. Single TDS Attack on First Power Area: For this attack, a hacker attacks the 
third state of the first power area at 2 sec for a time delay of 3 sec, and the time 
delay is increased to the value of 4.5 sec at 7 sec. Figure 5.2 shows that the 
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detector accurately tracked and monitored the TDS attack or any natural delay of 
the system.  
 
Figure 5.2: TDS Attack Detection and Tracking for Third State of First Power Area 
2. Simultaneous TDS Attack on Both Power Areas: In this scenario, we attacked 
the third state of both power areas simultaneously. TDS attacks 1 and 2 were 
injected into the first and the second power areas, respectfully. TDS attack 1 is 
applied at 2 sec for a value of 3 sec and at 8 sec to the value of 4.5 sec. TDS 
attack 2 occurs simultaneously with TDS attack 1 at 1.5 sec and 6 sec. Figure 5.3 
shows the results. 
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Figure 5.3: TDS Attack Detection and Tracking for Simultaneous TDS Attack on Both Power Areas 
3. Complex, Varied TDS Attack on Both Power Areas: In the last scenario, a 
TDS attack was injected at different times with different time-delay values. It is 
assumed that a hacker injects a TDS attack into the feedback lines of both power 
areas. In this simulation, an attacker starts a TDS attack on the second power area 
(the third state) at time of 1 second for std 53 = , and then increases it to std 103 = at 
20 sec. Furthermore, a hacker starts to attack the first power area (third state), at 1 
second with std 38 = , and increased it to std 5.48 =  at 30 seconds. Figures 5.4 and 
5.5 show TDS attacks and TDS attack tracking in real time. Figure 5.4 shows a 
TDS attack on the third state of the first power area, and Figure 5.5 shows an 
attack at the same state of the second power area.  
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Figure 5.4: TDS Attack Detection and Tracking for the Third State of the First Power Area 
 
Figure 5.5: TDS Attack Detection and Tracking for the Third State of the Second Power Area 
5.4 Conclusion 
In summary a simple method for tracking a time-delay switch attack on NCSs was 
demonstrated. This method relies on a time-delay estimator that estimates and tracks time 
delays introduced by a hacker. The time-delay detector compares the estimated time 
delay with the maximum time delay and issues an alarm signal when the estimated time 
delay is larger than the tolerable one.   
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CHAPTER 6                                                                                     
OVERCOMING STABILITY ISSUES OF A TIME-DELAY SWITCH ATTACK 
ON LINEAR NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS 
6.1 Introduction 
Too much effort has been put into the study of time-delay systems [15, 109, 110]. For 
example, Tan [15] proposed a neural network time-delay estimator for a class of 
nonlinear systems with time-varying delays, which must be trained off-line and must 
work well for periodic reference signals. Li et. al. [109] developed an adaptive control 
algorithm to guess random time delays in the Networked Control Systems (NCSs). 
Li et. al. proposed an algorithm that updates delay estimation using the gradient descent 
method and discovers plant parameters using an improved recursive least square. The 
authors asserted that the method is superior to the typical networked predictive control. 
However, the method is complex for even the simplest linear system. Furthermore, the 
authors did not show the results for time-delay control compensation, or any time track of 
variable delays. Yet, another example of time-delay estimation is the method of variable 
sampling to compensate for the time delay in a networked control system. A Multi-Layer 
Perceptron (MLP) neural network is used to learn the time delay off-line, as well as to 
predict its value during the on-line control operation [110]. This method assumes that 
time delay is constant, so it cannot be applied to the system under varying time delay 
attacks. All of the control methods developed for the compensation of time delays rely on 
a controller either robust to a maximum time delay using off-line estimates of time 
delays, or approximation of time delayed signals. In this paper, a general method is 
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Based on Chapter 5, Equation (6.2) is used to estimate the time delayτ .  
txAetBue
dt
d tA
m ≤≤−−−=
− ττητ τ ˆ0,)ˆ(ˆ 0)ˆ(  (6.2) 
Equation (27) is used to estimate the time delay τ . However, there are practical issues 
that need to be considered. Computing machines have finite memory and temporal 
resolution. Therefore, Equation (27) cannot be implemented without discrete 
approximation and boundedness assumptions. To guarantee the stability of calculations 
and limit the memory usage, the following condition must be added, maxττ < . This 
condition will allow the construction of a finite buffer to store the history of )(tu  from t  
to maxτ−t . Also, this will allow for the prevention of a runaway condition on τˆ . It should 
be noted that if the delay injected by  a hacker is more than maxτ , a trap condition signal 
will be sent to the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) center, and the 
controller switches it to open the loop control to stabilize the system. This switch is 
robust since the controller is equipped with a plant model by which it could predict the 
next state.  
After designing the delay time estimator, the attention is now on the combination of the 
plant model and controller. Let the performance error be )()()( txtrte −=  and the estimate 
of the performance error be )(ˆ)()(ˆ txtrte −= . The PID controller input is defined in terms 
of the estimated error as: 
dsseKt
dt
edKteKtu
t
IDP )(ˆ)(
ˆ
)(ˆ)(
0
++=  (6.3) 
and the optimal feedback controller as 
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)(ˆ)( teKtu = (6.4) 
where KP, KD, KI and K are proportional, derivative, integral and optimal gain 
respectively. 
The PID controller and optimal feedback controller gains can be designed in normal 
operation (with no TDS attacks). More detail on designing PID and optimal controllers 
can be found at [111] and [112], respectively. 
In this case, the controller was designed to depend on the error )(ˆ te that results from the 
estimate ˆ( )x t . If the estimate )(ˆ tx  converges to )(tx , then )(ˆ te converges to )(te  and is 
minimized by the controller such that the system )(tx converges to )(tr . However, this is 
not enough. Could )(ˆ tx  be estimated by knowing )( τ−tx ? This is an important 
component in finding a stable controller. To answer this question, consider the following 
argument. The plant model estimation equation is given by 
)()(ˆ)(ˆ tButxAtx +=  (6.5)
The delayed equation of the state is 
)()()( τττ −+−=− tButAxtx   (6.6) 
where )( τ−tx  and )( τ−tx  are measured by the plant model, )( τ−tu is unknown since τ  
is not known.  
Accordingly, the following equation is constructed 
)()(ˆ)(ˆ τττ −+−=− tButxAtx   (6.7) 
The elements of equation (6.7) are unknown because τ is unknown.  
Multiply Equation (6.7) by a positive definite constant gain matrix C, and subtract the 
resultant )(ˆ τ−txC   from )(ˆ tx of Equation (6.5).  In this way the following is obtained 
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Substituting )()()( τττ −−−=− tCAxtxCtCBu   into Equation (6.8) results in 
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 (6.9) 
Note that the first τ is the actual delay signal that is associated with the delayed signal x(t-
τ) itself, which is read via the communication channel. This τ is hidden and is not 
accessible to the control system. The second τ is associated with the plant estimator and 
estimate of the delay signal ߬̂ and delayed states ݔො. Equation (6.9) is stated assuming the 
fact that ߬̂ = ߬. Next, ),;( ττtem  is replaced by )ˆ,;( ττtem  of Equation (5.6) to obtain: 
[ ])ˆ,;()ˆ,;()()(ˆ)(ˆ ττττ tAeteCtButxAtx mm −−+=   (6.10) 
The above replacement makes the current predicted estimate of the plant state )(ˆ tx
dependent on the estimate of the time delay τˆ . In other words, an accurate estimate of the 
state depends on an accurate estimate of the time delay. In Equation (6.10), only if 
)ˆ,;()ˆ,;( ττττ tAete mm −  goes to zero as a result of  τˆ  converging toτ , then )(ˆ tx  will 
converge to )(tx . This means that the modeling error em should be exponentially damped, 
i.e., )ˆ,;()ˆ,;( ττττ tAete mm = .  
Notice that the method by which the plant estimate is constructed depends on the 
measured states of the plant, )( τ−tx , and the estimate of the state given the estimated 
time delay, )ˆ(ˆ τ−tx . The difference )ˆ(ˆ)( ττ −−− txtx  is the modeling error signal
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)ˆ,;( ττtem . The choice of the gain matrix C in equation (6.10) is dictated by balancing the 
requirements for having the plant model state depend on errors in time-delay estimation 
and guarantee that the control system remains stable. More details can be found in [113, 
114].    
This method was employed in MATLAB and its performance confirmed using a single-
input, single-output system, as well as a LFC control of a two-area distributed power 
systems. In the next section, the simulation results are presented and discussed.  
6.3 Controller Design Algorithm 
Step 1:  Initialize time-delay estimateτˆ , plant model state estimate xˆ  and model 
error em. Then, set the learning parameter η to a suitable value. Also, set 
the matrix C.  
Step 2: Obtain a plant state measurement (i.e., the sensed states of the plant 
)( τ−tx ), which could be time-delayed by τ(t).  
Step 3:  Compute the current state estimate, )(ˆ tx , using Equation (6.10). 
Step 4: Compute the delayed plant state estimate )ˆ(ˆ τ−tx  based on the model’s 
equation and the estimate of the performance error )(ˆ)()(ˆ txtrte −=  and 
model error )ˆ(ˆ)()ˆ,;( τ−−τ−=ττ txtxtem . 
Step 5: Compute the time-delay estimate τˆ , from Equation (6.2). 
Step 6: Compute the control signal ݑ(ݐ). For example, ݑ can be set by using 
Equation (6.3) or (6.4).  
Step 7: To prevent runaway conditions bound the control signal by ±umax, use the 
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time-delay estimate by τmax and plant model by ±xmax. 
Step 8:  Repeat Steps 2-7 until the estimate of the performance error ε<eˆ . 
6.4 Simulation Results 
A simple single-input, single-output system is considered under a variable time-delay 
attack with a variable reference signal. This test is conceived to demonstrate the usability 
and efficiency of this method.  The simulation model is given by: 
1)1()1)2(sin()(
)1)2(sin(4
1
)(
)(2)(7.0)(
21
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211
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 (6.11) 
where the total simulation time T=500 sec. Ta=T/2, Tb=T/2.2, T1=T2=T/10, λ1=0.005, 
λ2=0.0005, γ1=0.07, γ2=0.004, ωa=0.06, ω1=0.005 and the sampling period is 0.01 sec. 
The proposed PID controller was applied to track the reference signal under a TDS 
attack. Figure 6.2 shows the state of the plant in Equation (6.11) as tracking the desired 
trajectory r(t). The dotted line is the state of the system, while the other one is the 
reference signal. The tracking is almost perfect, even though the time delay varies by τ(t).  
Figure 6.3 shows the TDS attack detection and its tracking; the estimated time delay ˆ( )tτ  
tracks the time varying time delay τ(t) that can either be injected by a hacker or occurring 
naturally. The dotted line is time-delay estimate, while the other is the TDS attack. Note 
that in the first 80 seconds of the simulation of the system operation, the plant is not 
tracking the reference signal because the time variable t is less than the time delay τ(t). 
For this plant simulation, a PID controller was used with the following parameters KP=5, 
 99 
 
KI=2 and KD=1.5. The time-delay estimator learning rate η=0.32 and the plant model 
teacher forcing effort parameter is C=2. 
 
Figure 6.2: Tracking the Performance of a Single-input, Single-output System under TDS Attack 
 
Figure 6.3: Time Delay Tracking 
The simple, modified model-based control and time-delay estimation works for simple 
single-input, single-output systems under variable time-delay attacks; the distributed 
power control systems are considered where time-delay mitigation strategies are 
paramount. The focal point is the LFC system (mentioned in Section 4.4.2), where the 
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controller’s job is to regulate the state of a networked power system. Simulation studies 
were conducted to evaluate the effects of TDS attacks on the dynamics of the system. 
By solving the Riccati matrix equation, the close loop control is designed in the form of 
state feedback. For this simulation, the discrete linear-quadratic regulator design is used 
from the continuous cost function called the “lqrd” function in MATLAB 2013a. For 
simplicity of discussion, 2=N is set, which is defined as a two-area power system. Table 
4.3 shows parameter values used in this process. Since simulation for certain duration 
tracks a step load change, we also set both 1lPΔ  and 2lPΔ  to be zero.  
 
Figure 6.4: An Adaptive Load Frequency Control for a Two-area Power System Which is Robust to the 
TDS Attack Using the Modified Method 
Scenario 1: 
The hacker injects time delays into the second and eighth states at the time of 8 seconds 
and 24 seconds for the delay value of 1.28 seconds and 9 seconds, respectively. The LFC 
system equipped with the time-delay estimator performs as expected. Power states are 
regulated to zero, and the TDS attack is detected and time delay is tracked. Figure 6.5 
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shows the detection and track of the time delay, and Figure 6.6 shows all states of the 
two-area interconnected power system. As it is clear from the figures, the modified 
controller is able to control the LFC distributed system under a TDS attack. In Figure 6.6, 
initial delays direct the system away from the stable point, however, shortly after, time 
delays are estimated and the controller recovers the regulating power states to zero. 
 
Figure 6.5: TDS Attack Tracking 
 
 
Figure 6.6: All States for Two-area LFC Power System under TDS Attack Using the Modified Optimal 
Controller 
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Scenario 2: 
In this scenario, a TDS attack is injected at 1 second and 3 seconds in time for delay 
values of 5 seconds and 7 seconds for the second and the eighth states. Figure 6.7 shows 
that the tracking scheme works well and as expected, and could track the TDS attack. 
Figure 6.8, Figure 6.9, Figure 6.10, and Figure 6.11 show the simulation results of the 
frequency and power deviation of the generator, value position of the turbine, and tie-line 
power flow of the first power area with and without the modified control method, 
respectively. It shows that the system will be unstable when under a TDS attack, if the 
modified method is not applied. In the abovementioned figures, the TOC and MOC 
denote the traditional optimal controller and the modified optimal controller, respectively.
 
Figure 6.7: Time-Delay Tracking under a TDS Attack 
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Figure 6.8: Frequency Deviation, KfΔ  
 
Figure 6.9: Power Deviation of Generator, KgPΔ  
 
Figure 6.10: Value Position of the Turbine, KtuPΔ  
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Figure 6.11: Tie-line Power Flow, 1pfPΔ  
Scenario 3: 
This scenario is exactly the same as the second one, except that 15 percent of disturbance 
and noise were added to the system. As it is clear in Figure 6.12, the modified control 
technique could detect, track, and control the LFC system during a TDS attack and some 
disturbances. Figures 6.13 and Figure 6.14 show the tracking performance of the value 
position of the turbine system during a TDS attack for the first and the second power 
areas, respectively. 
 
Figure 6.12: TDS Attack Tracking 
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Figure 6.13: Value Position of the Turbine System during a TDS Attack for the First Power Area Control 
System 
 
Figure 6.14: Value Position of the Turbine System during a TDS Attack for the Second Power Area 
Control System 
6.5 Conclusion  
The LTI systems were able to be controlled with variable time delays either occurring 
naturally or as a result of a time-delay attack by a hacker. The TDS attack was tracked 
with the proposed method. One kind of delay was addressed specifically, that is, the 
delay in the observed state of the controlled system. In this paper, only the LTI system in 
state feedback was examined. In future papers, research will show that it works for a 
class of nonlinear systems.  
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CHAPTER 7                                                                                     
CONTROL OF NONLINEAR SYSTEM UNDER A TDS ATTACK: 
EVALUATION OF METHODS  
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, several existing common controllers, such as the Model Predictive 
Controller (MPC), PID controller, and emotional learning controller (ELC) were 
evaluated during a TDS attack. Also, a new simple technique was proposed, called the 
“emergency controller,” which overcomes stability issues caused by a TDS attack based 
on the TDS detector described in Chapter 4. The emergency controller was applied to the 
LFC application described in Section 4.4.2 and evaluated the ELC and other methods on 
the 2nd-order heartbeat model described in Section 4.4.3.  
For the second application (heartbeat model), the controllability and observability of the 
heartbeat model are assumed and discussed in [90]. The nonlinear feedback Emotional 
Learning PI Control (ELPIC) technique is proposed in Section 7.2 and discussed in 
detail. Finally, we present experiments to verify that this method works well and as 
expected. The conclusion shows that this method is powerful enough to track the ECG 
signal and is more robust, when it is compared with the other control methods during a 
TDS attack or random delay in the sensing loop. 
The emergency controller design is described in Section 7.4. The simulation is applied to 
a two-area power system with the LFC and shows the simplicity and cost-effectiveness of 
this technique.  
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7.2 Emotional Learning Controller (ELC) 
The emotional learning controller (ELC) was presented by Moren and Balkenious for the 
first time. They began the process of evolving to evolve computational models for parts 
of the human brain that carry out emotional functioning. In [115], a new computational 
model of brain emotional learning included the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, thalamus, 
and sensory cortex, as shown in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1: Scheme of Brain Emotional Learning Model 
The amygdale is a small unit in the brain, which is involved in emotional evaluation of 
the stimuli. These emotional states and reactions derive “alarm signals” and “motor 
control commands.” Some of the inherent exciters such hunger, pain, certain smells, etc., 
can excite the amygdale. The amygdale responding to these stimulants is used in 
learning. On the other hand, the orbitofrontal cortex plays a role of a modifier of 
inappropriate responses and reactions of the amygdale. Numerous experiments on 
patients with damaged orbitofrontal-cortex revealed that they are not able to adapt 
themselves to new conditions [116], in the other words, previous learning does not let 
them understand and respond to new conditions. 
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The ELC consists of two sections that carry out the learning section and control section: 
one corresponds to information processed by the amygdala, and the other by the 
orbitofrontal cortex. Basically, input stimuli (signals) are processed and used to gain 
control of coefficients (synaptic efficacies) to affect the future process of stimuli and 
motor control commands. By ignoring some of the details in Figure 7.1, the 
computational emotional learning model of amygdale-orbitofrontal is shown in Figure 
7.2. 
MO
AO
OCO
 
Figure 7.2: Overall Computational Model of ELC 
The output of the computational model can be found as: 
OCAM OOO −= (7.1)
where  MO  is the model output, AO  and OCO  are the amygdale and the orbitofrontal cortex 
unit output, respectively.  
The outputs of the amygdale and orbitofrontal units are described by: 
SAA IGO ⋅= (7.2)
SOCOC IGO ⋅= (7.3)
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where AG is the amygdale gain, SI  is the sensory input, and OCG is the orbitofrontal 
cortex gain. The amygdale and orbitofrontal learning laws can be modeled as: 
)(1 PRMOC IOkG −⋅=Δ (7.4)
{ }APRA OIMaxkG −⋅=Δ ,02 (7.5)
where PRI  is the primary reward, and 1k and 2k  are the rates of learning related to 
orbitofrontal and amygdale, respectively.  
The Equation (7.5) shows that the amygdale learning uses max operation. Therefore, the 
amygdale gain is forced to have a consistently increasing deviation. This emphasizes the 
physiological fact of the amygdale unit which records what it learns. 
Now, let us use Equations (7.1), (7.2), and (7.3) to find a general formula: 
SOCAM IGGO )( −= (7.6)
Based on the above equation, we can conclude that the output for of the amygdale-
orbitofrontal unit in the emotional learning system depends on the amygdale and 
orbitofrontal gains, and the sensory inputs. It should be noted that these gains depend on 
the primary reward signal. 
In this chapter, the sensory input of the emotional learning system is formulated with a 
format similar to the self-tuning PID: 
++= tIDPS dtteKteKteKtI 0 )()()()(   (7.7)
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where PK , DK , and IK are the proportional gain, the derivative gain, and the integral gain, 
respectively. The signal )(te  is the difference value between the reference value and the 
output value at any time instant. However, to get a better response in front of noise, PI 
was used instead of PID as the sensory input to the amygdale-orbitofrontal emotional 
learning system. The next section will show how this controller improves the 
performance of the system in the attack operations and tracks the reference ECG signal 
very well. 
7.3 Simulation Result Based on ELC Controller: Evaluation of Methods 
The 2nd order heartbeat model was simulated to track the ECG signal using the ELPIC. 
Then, an external TDS attack or random feedback delay is applied to the model from a 
start time St until a final time Ft  to show the performance of the ELPIC. This is compared 
with the classical PID and the MPC.  
Figure 7.3 shows the ECG reference tracking )(2 tX  using the ELPIC. The line shows the 
output of the model controlled by the ELPIC, and the dotted line indicates the patient’s 
ECG referenced signal [95]. The result shows that the ELPIC tracks the reference signal 
accurately.  
The TDS attack or feedback delay is applied to the model from 4.0=St seconds until 
45.0=St seconds, with the time-delay of 01.0=τ seconds. For the purpose of visual 
comparison, the attack period and the amount of attack are selected as a lower level. Due 
to the larger period and time-delay value, the classical PI and MPC controllers move out 
of visual boundaries. Figures 7.4 and 7.5 compare the ELPIC with the classical PI and the 
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MATLAB’s MPC. The results clearly show that the ELPIC is more robust during a TDS 
attack or unwanted random feedback delay. 
 
Figure 7.3: Simulation Result of ECG Tracking for Second-Order Heartbeat Model Based on ELPIC 
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Figure 7.4: Comparison of the ELPIC and the Classical PID for ECG Tracking during a TDS Attack 
 
Figure 7.5: Comparison of the ELPIC and the MPC for ECG Tracking during a TDS Attack 
In summary, the ELC applied to Zeeman nonlinear heart model is able to track the ECG 
signal with a high level of reliability. Furthermore, the robustness of the ELC’s ability to 
control the Zeeman heart model under a time-delay switch attack was demonstrated. The 
stability and control of the operations are evaluated. We have also demonstrated that ELC 
is more robust than other common control schemes, such as the classical PID and the 
MPC.  
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dsseKt
dt
deKteKtu
t
IDP )()()()(
0
++=  (7.8)
)()( tKetu = (7.9)
where the error is )()()( txtrte −= . Either controller, i.e., the PID or the optimal controller, 
can be designed to be robust to some maximum time-delay stableτ . The emergency 
controller sits close to the plant and operates only in case of emergency such as an attack 
on the communication line between the plant and controller. The emergency controller 
could either be a PID controller or optimal controller with the goal to stabilize the system 
to a particular reference trajectory rE.  
Suppose there is a time-delay attack on the system with delay τ . The time-delay 
estimator estimates the delay for τˆ . The delay estimator is described in Chapter 5. The 
cyber-attack detector will use the time-delay estimate to perform the following function 

 >
=
otherwise
c
D stable
0
ˆ1 ττ , (7.10)
where ܿ is a constant between 0 and 1. In case D=1, an alarm signal is sent to the 
controller to shut it down, and a negative acknowledgement is sent to the emergency 
controller to stabilize the plant. The control strategy is shown in Figure 7.6.   
The emergency controller method was implemented with MATLAB and its performance 
was studied using the LFC of a two-area distributed power system. In the next section, 
the simulation results are discussed in detail.  
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7.5 Simulation Result and Conclusion Using Local Controller-Based Design 
The simulation was conducted on the LFC described in Section 4.4.2 for the proposed 
emergency controller described in Section 7.4.  
The assumption is that a hacker injects a TDS attack into the feedback lines of both 
power areas. In this simulation, an attacker starts a TDS attack to the second power area 
(the third state) at time 1 second for std 53 = , and then increases it at 20 seconds for 
std 103 = . Furthermore, a hacker starts to attack the first power area (third state), at 1 
second with std 38 = , and increases it to std 5.48 =  at 30 seconds. We also set the 
sstable 4.0=τ based on the stability analysis of the LFC system in Section 4.4.2. The 
negative acknowledgment (neck) is then sent to the emergency controller in the case 
where the detected value of the time delay is larger than the maximum time delay. 
Figures 7.7 and Figure 7.8 show the third state of the first and the second power areas 
under attack with a traditional optimal controller (TOC) and proposed control technique 
(PCT), respectively. It is clear from the results that the simulated attack makes the system 
unstable. The proposed technique, however, can overcome a TDS attack on the simulated 
system.  
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Figure 7.7: Value Position of the Turbine System during a TDS Attack for the First Power-Area Control 
System 
 
Figure 7.8: Value Position of the Turbine System during a TDS Attack for the Second Power-Area Control 
System 
In summary, a simple and cost-effective method for overcoming the stability effects of a 
TDS attack on NCSs has been successfully demonstrated. The method relied on a time-
delay estimator that estimates and tracks time delays introduced by a hacker. With 
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stable and secure, the time-delay detector compares the estimated time delay with the 
tolerable time delay and issues an alarm signal when the estimated time delay is larger 
than the tolerable one. It also directs the system to an alarm state. In an alarm state, the 
plant is under the control of the emergency controller, local to the plant. The plant 
remains in this mode until the networked control system state is restored and the time-
delay switch is eliminated. 
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CHAPTER 8                                                                                     
CF-TDSR: A CRYPTOGRAPHY-FREE TDS RECOVERY PROTOCOL 
8.1  Introduction 
In recent years, the security of control systems has raised many important research 
questions. For instance, NCSs, which are used to monitor and control systems distributed 
over a wide area, are a groundbreaking approach to control systems used in power 
systems. Modern power grids depend on computers and multi-purpose networks for 
operation. This renders them vulnerable to attacks, including high-profile cyber attacks 
[21, 78, 117, 118] that have a potentially major societal impact. 
TDS attacks delay the transmission of measured signals from the plant output to the 
controller. Most communication algorithms have proposed the use of timestamps to 
address naturally occurring delays in the communication between plants and their 
controllers in the NCS [119, 120]. However, timestamping is not effective against TDS 
attacks, since the attackers can manipulate both the data and the timestamps.    
Consider, for instance, a hacker that can manipulate both the data content and the 
timestamps of telemetered information (sensed from the output sensor). The data sent to 
the controller consists of a sequence of points of the form ))(,( txt , where x(t) denotes the 
state of the plant at time t. The attacker can modify this data in one of several ways. First, 
manipulate the timestamps, i.e., send ))(,( txdt − . Second, delay the state values, i.e., send 
))(,( dtxt − . Third, change both the timestamp and the data, i.e., send ))(,( 21 dtxdt −− . 
Finally, the attacker can simply drop the packets. 
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Cryptographic solutions may be used to detect such attacks. For instance, the packets can 
be authenticated, e.g., using keyed hashes (e.g., HMAC), and computed using a key 
shared only by the controller and the plant. Even if the cryptographic constructs are fast 
and will introduce only small delays and computing overhead, they are unable to recover 
from denial of service (DoS) attacks, or to recover data delayed or destroyed by the 
hacker. The controller will be forced to request the retransmission of the lost or corrupt 
packets, leading to additional delays and a higher network load that can destabilize the 
entire system.  
In this chapter, the adaptive channel allocation techniques are leveraged, along with the 
state predictors and time-delay detectors to address the challenges introduced by TDS 
attacks. Adaptive resource allocation techniques and channel adaptive methods provide 
substantial improvements and robust performance under many benchmarking metrics 
[121]. These methods utilize an adaptive allocation of communication resources as the 
channel conditions change with time [122].   
The Cryptography-Free TDS Recovery (CF-TDSR) is introduced in this section, which 
requires the controller to first compare the received timestamp against an internally 
generated value. The CF-TDSR requires time synchronization between the plant and the 
controller. If a discrepancy is detected, then the telemetered information is discarded. The 
controller instead uses the predicted state, generated by a state predictor. If the data has 
been delayed, the controller compares the value of the measured states against an 
internally predicted value of states. If the difference exceeds a predetermined threshold, 
the controller drops the packet and uses the estimated state instead. In both cases, the 
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controller sends a command signal to the data measurement unit to transmit the next data 
sets over multiple channels.  
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 8.2, relevant work is described. In 
Section 8.3, the system and hacker model are provided, along with TDS attacks. The LFC 
system is introduced, and the adaptive allocation method is used to demonstrate 
mechanisms to restore stability after a time-delay attack. In the following section, a 
special type of TDS attack is modeled as a DoS attack. In Section 8.4, the CF-TDSR is 
introduced and its ability to eliminate the effects of time delay attacks is demonstrated. In 
Section 8.5, the simulation results are presented and discussed.   
8.2 Related Works 
In this chapter, the main focus is on the role of the NCS application in power systems. 
The control of the NCS in power systems with time delays has been previously explored 
[21, 78, 96, 107, 108, 123, 124].  The researchers, however, considered either the 
construction of controllers that are robust to time delays or controllers that use offline 
estimation. At this time, there seem to be no control methods and adaptive 
communication protocol that implement an online estimation of dynamic time delays and 
real-time control of power systems to overcome TDS attacks. 
The stability of power control system controllers with time delays was studied in [99-
103]. The author of [104] studied the stability eﬀects of delays to the smaller signal 
power systems. References [99] and [100] proposed methods to reduce oscillations 
resulting from time-delayed feedback control. Paper [105] introduced a wide-area control 
system for oscillations of a generator. Based on phasor measurements with delays, a 
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novel controller was suggested in [96] and the power system’s small signal stability was 
considered. In [106], a feedback controller for power systems with delayed states was 
proposed. The controller addresses the combined effects of the instantaneous as well as 
delayed states using the quadratic Lyapunov function. 
Related work on time delays was discussed in Chapters 2 and 5. In conclusion, control 
methods developed to compensate for time delays rely either on a robust controller to a 
maximum time delay, on off-line estimates of time delays, or on approximations of time-
delayed signals. In this chapter, a general method for the control of systems experiencing 
TDS attacks was also proposed. The CF-TDSR applies to continuous linear time-
invariant systems. 
8.3 A Unified Approach 
In this section, a unified approach to model a specific case of TDS attacks as DoS attacks 
is proposed. Then, techniques will be investigated that address TDS attacks. Consider a 
LTI system described by 
Kxu
wBuAxx
−=
++=
 (8.1) 
where rRx ∈  and nRu ∈  are state and control functions, respectively. Matrices A, B and K 
are constant with appropriate dimensions. The nRw∈  is an n-dimensional zero-mean 
Gaussian white noise process. Suppose that a TDS attack occurs with probability p . 
Subsequently, the result is 
( )


−−
−+−
=
ptBKxtAx
ptwtxBKA
tx
)()(
1)()(
)(
τ
  (8.2) 
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To simplify this explanation, in (8.2), it is assumed that the same probability of attack 
occurs on different channels and states. If a TDS attack occurs, packets are dropped. 
Then, Equation (8.2) is formulated in the form of a DoS attack, as follows 
( )


+
−+−
=
ptwtAx
ptwtxBKA
tx
)()(
1)()(
)(  (8.3) 
Let us calculate expectation value of x in (8.3) as: 
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Let )}({)( txEt =μ , then we can write (8.4) as 
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( ) )()1(
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−−=
+−−=
 (8.5) 
where 0)}({ =twE .Next, the stability of Equation (8.5) is investigated. For the system 
described in (8.5) to be stable, the mean should be bounded. Therefore, this equation 
must have: 
}0)1({ <−− BKpA  (8.6) 
hence, 
0<+− pBKBKA  (8.7) 
i.e., pBKBkA +− must be a negative definite when the controller is stable, and the next 
result must have 
0<− BKA  (8.8) 
To satisfy stability, condition (8.7) must be made similar to (8.8). To do this, two 
defenses are introduced. First, the probability of a TDS attack on the communication 
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channel is decreased. Second, the controller gain is changed. In the following probability 
equations, both cases are described. 
Decrease TDS Attack Probability. 
( )


+
−+−
= l
l
ptwtAx
ptwtxBKAtx
)()(
1)()()(  (8.9) 
Equation (8.9) will take the following form: 
0)()( 1 <+−− lpIIBKA  (8.10) 
Therefore, we get: 
0)()()()( 111 <+−<+−<− −−− pIIBKApIIBKAIBKA l  (8.11) 
The condition in Equation (8.11) shows that if l > 1 channel is allocated to increase the 
redundancy of transmitted plant data, the total probability of faults will decrease as a 
result of a TDS attack. Also, we will be able to bring the controlled system closer to its 
original state, i.e., A-BK < 0. Therefore, by adaptively adding another communication 
channel(s), the LFC system can be stabilized. The cost of channel redundancy limits the 
number of communication channels that can be added to address TDS attacks. The 
alternative is to change the controller gain. The second approach shown below illustrates 
how this can be accomplished.  
Change Controller Gain. Changing the controller gain K to stabilize the NCS is 
proposed. The new controller gain parameter is set to be ( )pKK p −= 1/ . In this case, a 
limited number of channels only need to be added. However, adjusting the controller gain 
K is subject to how well the probability of attack p is estimated. In Section 8.4, this 
control methodology is described in detail.  
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8.4 CF-TDSR: A Crypto-Free TDS Recovery Protocol 
In this section, we introduce the CF-TDSR, a communication and control protocol that 
thwarts TDS attacks on networked control systems. The CF-TDSR leverages methods to 
detect time delays introduced by a hacker. The CF-TDSR consists of the following 
components (see Figure 8.1, for the system diagram). First, the smart data transmitter 
(Tx) adaptively allocates transmission channels on demand. Second, the plant model 
estimates the current plant states and helps stabilize the network controlled system when 
under attack. Third, the time-delay estimator continuously estimates the time delays on 
the channels. Fourth, the time-delay detector determines if delays are detrimental to the 
system. In this case, it will issue commands to inform the transmitter (plant) and 
controller. The last component is the proportional-integral-derivative (PID) or optimal 
controller to control the system (control block in Figure 8.1). The CF-TDSR will detect 
and track time delays introduced by a hacker and guide the plant to track the reference 
signal to guarantee system stability. 
 
Figure 8.1: Block Diagram of CF-TDSR 
 
The CF-TDSR is flexible and is able to support communication between the plant and the 
controller with and without timestamps. In the case where timestamps are used, the 
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controller compares the controller clock and the packet time stamp and the state of the 
plant with the state predicted by the plant model. If there are any differences, the packet 
is dropped. If this is the case, the controller sends a negative acknowledgment (NACK) 
signal to the communication transmitter to use an adaptive channel allocation. Finally, the 
controller uses the state predicted by the plant model instead of the state received in the 
packet to control the system while it waits for the corrected packet.  
In the case where timestamps are not used, the time estimator continuously estimates time 
delays while the plant model determines the appropriate plant state values (Chapter 5 
described the time-delay estimation, and Chapter 6 described the state estimation for 
controller). If the estimated time delays are longer than the tolerable time delay, or if the 
plant state estimates are very different from the received plant states, the communicated 
packet is dropped. Similar to the previous case, in this case, the controller signals the 
communication transmitter to use adaptive channel allocation and uses its internal state 
estimates for control. In this way, by using the adaptive channel allocation and the robust 
plant state estimator, the controller is able to thwart TDS attacks. 
The functionality of the delay detector elaborated above can be captured with the 
following mathematical formula  
( ) ( ) ( )

 ≥>>−
=
otherwise
orteortt
tD stablemstablesc
0
ˆ)(1
)(
ττετ  (8.12)
where D(t) is the time-delay detection function, tc is the time value of the clock 
maintained by the controller, ts is the timestamp of the packet generated at the transmitter, 
and τstable is the maximum tolerable time delay, for which the system remains in the stable 
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region. Its value can be calculated from the eigenvalues of the system, for example, 
finding the eigenvalues of LFC, as shown in Section 4.4.2.  The difference between the 
transmitted state of the plant x(t) and the plant estimator record of the system state )(tx  is 
)(ˆ)()( txtxtem −= . The parameter ε is the tolerable error value. Since a TDS attack occurs 
with probability p, then D=1 with probability p and D=0 with probability 1-p. Equation 
(8.12) enables the detection of TDS attacks irrespective of the use of timestamps, and 
even if the timestamps are modified by the hacker. In the next section, each CF-TDSR 
component will be examined and discussed and detail. 
We use Equation (5.9) to estimate the time delay, τ , considering that computing 
machines have finite memory and temporal resolution. Therefore, we are unable to 
implement Equation (5.9) without discrete approximation and boundedness assumptions. 
To guarantee the stability of calculations and limit the memory usage, the following 
condition, maxττ <  must be added. This condition will allow for a construction of a finite 
buffer to store the history of )(tu  from t  to maxτ−t . Also, this will allow us to prevent a 
runaway condition on τˆ .  
8.5 Simulation Results and Discussion  
8.5.1 TDS Attack on LFC Model 
Consider a LFC system of the form: 
)()()()( twtButAxtx ++=  (8.13)
with the optimal controller given by: 
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where )(tD  is a digital random process. D(t) is 1 when a TDS attack is detected (see 
Equation (8.12)), and is zero otherwise. TDS attacks are detected by comparing the 
received timestamp from the plant against the controller time, or by using the time-delay 
estimator. The new state estimate, )(ˆ tx , is given by: 
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Let the estimation error be )()(ˆ)( txtxtem −= . The dynamics of the closed loop can be 
calculated as: 
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We now investigate the stability of Equation (8.8). We want the mean of the estimation 
error em(t) converge to zero, for a reasonable stability criteria, and for the covariance of 
em(t) to remain bounded. If em(t) bounds the covariance, the state x(t) remains stable. We 
compute the total expectation value over both )(tx and )(tD , knowing that 1)( =tD  with 
probability p , when there is an attack on one channel. Thus, we can express the equation 
of the system under attack as: 
( )

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+−−
−+−
=
ptwtBKetxBKA
ptwtxBKA
tx
m )()()()(
1)()(
)(  (8.17)
Therefore, the total expectation yields: 
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Let us now assume we add l  channels to the communication channel. Hence, we have: 
l
m ptBKtBKAt )()()()( μμμ −−=  (8.19)
If the term lm ptBK )(μ  is zero, (8.19) will converge to zero and the system will be stable. 
Therefore, the idea is to make that term as small as possible by choosing a large l , or by 
using a good estimator for the system that can make this term closer to zero or bounded. 
If the delay injected by the hacker exceeds maxτ , a trap condition signal will be sent to the 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) center.  Then, the controller 
switches to open the loop control to stabilize the system. This switch is robust, since the 
controller is equipped with a plant model through which it can predict the next state.  
8.5.2 Simulation of CF-TDSR on LFC System 
Simulations are conducted to evaluate the performance of CF-TDSR experiencing TDS 
attacks. The discrete linear-quadratic regulator design from the “lqrd” continuous cost 
function (MATLAB 2013a) is used to generate the optimal control law for the system in 
normal operation. The two-area power systems are modeled, as described in Section 
4.2.2.  Table 4.3 shows the parameter values used in the simulation, based on practical 
values and literature [21, 78]. Also, 1lPΔ  and 02 =Δ lP is set, and the sampling time is set to 
0.01sec. 
The goal of the simulation is to determine the ability of the CF-TDSR to quickly respond 
to the TDS attacks. The total simulation time is set as 50 seconds. The example assumes a 
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powerful hacker that has access to the communication channel. The hacker starts the TDS 
attack with values of [ ]Tdndd ttt 21=τ . Each power area has five states. Since the two-
power-area systems, n, are considered in this equation, the total number of states in the 
interconnected model is 10. Consider that the attack starts at time at .  
The simulation is performed in three main scenarios: single power plant attack, 
composite TDS attack, and simultaneous composite TDS attack on a noisy system and 
limited available channel. 
Single Plant TDS Attack 
In the first investigation, a hacker has access only to the first power area, and can only 
launch TDS attacks on the specific channel. The existence of multiple channels that the 
CF-TDSR can allocate is assumed, but the demonstrated method only needs a limited 
number of channels.  A powerful hacker can launch multiple and sequential TDS attacks. 
Figure 8.2 shows the results of the experiment. Figure 8.2(a) describes the attack that was 
launched: the red dashed line denotes a TDS attack on the first channel that occurs at time 
1-3 seconds with a delay of 4 seconds, followed by a TDS attack on channel 2 between 3-
4 seconds with a delay of 2.5 seconds (blue dashed line), then a TDS attack on channel 3 
between 9-20 seconds (green dashed line), and a TDS attack on channel 4, with a delay of 
9 seconds, from time 25 seconds to 50 seconds. Figure 8.2(b) shows that the CF-TDSR 
detects each attack and requests a change of channel. The attack on channel 4 is not 
effective, because the system has already approached the stable region. The conclusion is 
that when the system is at optimal value (close to zero), it is more difficult for the TDS to 
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destabilize the system and force the CF-TDSR to request an additional channel. 
Furthermore, the CF-TDSR quickly detects the attacks on different channels.  
Figure 8.2(c) shows the frequency deviation, KfΔ , of the power system. Figure 8.2(d) 
shows the power deviation of the generator, KgfΔ . Figure 8.2(e) shows the value position 
of the turbine, KtufΔ . Figure 8.2(f) shows Tie-line power flow, lpffΔ . These figures are 
proof that the states remain stable and converge to zero under a TDS attack. Figures 
8.2(c)-8.2(f) compared a scenario where the state estimator is on (CF-TDSR, the red line) 
to the results of a scenario where the state estimator is off (black dashed line) with an 
unlimited number of communication channels. In both cases, the time-delay estimator 
and channel adaptation are on. The figures show that the CF-TDSR is clearly superior. 
The results show that the cost function value is improved, 21.5=ΔJ , when the state 
estimator is running and take cares of the TDS attack until a new channel is added to the 
system.  
Composite TDS Attack  
In the second investigation, a case is simulated where a hacker attacks the third state of 
the first and the second power areas. In this scenario, only two communication channels 
are available. The third state of each area provides the feedback and is ideal for the TDS 
attack. The attack starts at 1=at second for the first power area, and at 3=at  seconds for 
the second time area, with time-delay values of 5.13 =dt seconds (the third state of the 
first plant) and 38 =dt  seconds, respectively. Figure 8.3(a) illustrates the TDS attack that 
was implemented.  
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The behavior of the LFC distributed power system under attack in three scenarios was 
evaluated. The first scenario called the “Baseline” runs without any modification to the 
communication protocol and to the controller. The second scenario called the “Adaptive” 
evaluates the LFC under the attack using an adaptive communication protocol. The third 
scenario evaluates the LFC system using the CF-TDSR, i.e., using both the adaptive 
communication protocol and controller design defenses. 
In Figure 8.2, the x axis denotes the time. (a) Illustration of a sophisticated, sequential, 
and multi-channel attack: Each of the 4 bumps corresponds to a TDS attack launched on 
a different channel. (b) Evolution in time of CF-TDSR: The time when the CF-TDSR 
detects each attack, and requests to change the channel. The attack on channel 4 is not 
effective because the system has already approached the stable region. (c) The frequency 
deviation of the power system during the attacks. (d) The power deviation of the 
generator during the attacks. (e) Evolution in time of the value position of the turbine 
during the attacks. (f) Tie-line power flow during the attack. Figures 8.2(c) to 8.2(f) 
compare the CF-TDSR (red line) to a version where the state estimator is off (black line). 
The CF-TDSR greatly improves over a state estimator-free version. 
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(a) 
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 (e) 
 
(f) 
Figure 8.2: TDS Attack on one Power Area 
Figure 8.3 shows that the CF-TDSR is capable of detecting the TDS attack, and of 
quickly adapting the communication protocol. Note that when the CF-TDSR detects a 
delay larger than 0.4 sec, it sends a NACK to the sender, as suggested by the study of 
eigenvalues for the stability of the system [4]. Figure 8.3 (b)-(f) shows the frequency 
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deviation, the power deviation of the generator, the value position of the turbine, and the 
tie-line power flow of the first power area, respectively. The figure shows that the system 
becomes stable only when using the CF-TDSR. The results show that the CF-TDSR 
works very well, even with strict limitations on the number of available channels, when 
all states converge to zero as expected. 
 
(a) TDS attacks 
 
(b) Frequency deviation, KfΔ  
 
(c) Power deviation of generator, KgPΔ  
 
(d) Value position of the turbine, KtuPΔ  
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 (e) Tie-line power flow, 1pfPΔ  
 
(f) control error 
Figure 8.3: Composite TDS Attack on one State of Two-Power Area Plant 
Concurrent TDS Attack for the Noisy System and Limited Available Channel 
In the final experiment, the system behavior under the noise is studied. In order to 
accomplish this, first, 20% of white Gaussian noise is added to the communication 
channel. Then, a TDS attack is launched on both power areas: The attacker 
simultaneously launches the attack on the third state of both the first and the second 
power areas at time 1 second and 4 sec, with a 2-second delay. Then, the delay value is 
increased at time 7 sec to the value of 5 sec and 6.5 sec. In this experiment, the 
availability of a single communication channel is assumed. This assumption severely 
restricts the CF-TDSR’s options. Figure 8.4 shows that even under such restrictions, the 
CF-TDSR is able to accurately detect and prevent the noise-based TDS attack. More 
specifically, Figure 8.4 (a) shows how the CF-TDSR detects and tracks the TDS attack in 
real time. Figures 8.4 (b) and 8.4 (c) show the third state of the first and second power 
areas under the noise-based TDS attack. They show that the CF-TDSR performs very 
well, even in the absence of additional communication channels.   
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
 (c) 
Figure 8.4: TDS Attack Injected at the Same Time on Both Power Areas 
8.6 Conclusion 
Industrial control systems share information via a variety of communication protocols, 
making them vulnerable to attack by hackers at any infrastructure point. In this article, 
the time delay attacks were the main focus. The CF-TDSR, a communication protocol 
that uses adaptive channel redundancy techniques, was developed, as well as a novel state 
estimator to detect and obviate instable effects of a TDS attack.  It was demonstrated that 
the CF-TDSR enabled the linear time-invariant control systems to achieve stability. The 
simulation experiments show the CF-TDSR enabling the multi-area load frequency 
control component to quickly stabilize the system under a suite of TDS attacks. 
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CHAPTER 9                                                                                     
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
9.1 Conclusion 
Based on a literature review and reviewing various types of attacks and failures in NCSs, 
it was found that the security of industrial control systems is very important and should 
be studied by researchers. Important fundamental knowledge about NCS and the security 
of those systems was discovered, a general attack model for the NCS was introduced.   
In the third chapter, the time-delay effects of an SVPWM-based switching pattern for a 
grid-connected three-phase current source inverter were studied.  An algorithm was 
proposed to track the time delay in real time to overcome the effects of time delays 
produced in the sensing loop. This guarantees synchronization between the grid phase 
and inverter output. An observer state feedback controller was applied to overcome the 
effects of time delays in the control signal.  An optimal control design for systems with 
natural time delay was studied to show that controlling such systems is quite complex and 
is the reason most researchers ignore time delay in their control design process.  
In the following chapter, a new type of attack is introduced, called the TDS attack, to the 
NCS. The stability analysis of a NCS during a TDS attack is studied mathematically, and 
the effects of TDS attacks on two different applications are simulated. First, the LFC 
power system under a TDS attack was modeled using hybrid systems, and the TDS 
attacks are formulated as switch action “Off/Delay-by-τ” sensing channels or control 
inputs. Then, the destabilizing action of TDS attacks on power systems was studied by 
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using methods from hybrid systems theories. A two-area LFC LTI model was simulated 
to evaluate the effects of TDS attacks. The results show that TDS attacks affect the 
dynamic performance of the LFC system, and in many cases, could destroy the system’s 
stability, which can be launched at any time during the operation of the power system. 
For the second application, we applied a TDS attack on a wireless pacemaker, and then 
simulated the results by creating a nonlinear dynamic model of system. We showed that 
TDS attacks can cause stability issues in NCS. 
Afterward, a method to track and detect the TDS attack on NCS was proposed. This 
detection method was used to alert monitoring centers like SCADA, as well as to 
overcome stability issues of TDS attacks in the following chapters. Based on this 
detection method, a simple method for preventing a time-delay switch attack on 
networked control systems was demonstrated. The method relied on a time-delay 
estimator that estimates and tracks time delays introduced by a hacker. With knowledge 
of the tolerable time delay of the control system, for which the plant remains stable and 
secure, the time-delay detector compares the estimated time delay to the tolerable time 
delay and issues an alarm signal when the estimated time delay is larger than the tolerable 
time delay. It also directs the system to an alarm state. In an alarm state, the plant is under 
the control of the emergency controller, local to the plant. The plant remains in this mode 
until the networked control system state is restored and the time-delay switch is 
eliminated. This method is simple and is an inexpensive way to assure that an industrial 
control system remains stable and secure. 
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In the Chapter 6, the ability to control LTI systems with variable time delays either 
occurring naturally or as a result of a time-delay attack by a hacker was demonstrated. 
The ability to track TDS attacks with the proposed method described in Chapter 5 was 
also demonstrated.  One specific type of delay, that is, the delay in the observed state of 
the controlled system, was addressed. The only system that was examined was the LTI 
system in state feedback. This method is general, and in the future, further research will 
show that it works for a class of nonlinear systems. 
In the last chapter, a new protocol called CF-TDSR was proposed to overcome TDS 
attack effects on NCSs. The CF-TDSR was developed, which is a communication 
protocol that uses adaptive channel redundancy techniques and a novel state estimator to 
detect and obviate the destabilizing effects of TDS attacks. The CF-TDSR enabled the 
linear time invariant control systems to achieve stability. The proposed protocol on the 
LFC system was simulated, and the simulation experiments showed that CF-TDSR 
enables the multi-area load frequency control component to quickly stabilize following a 
suite of powerful TDS attacks. 
9.2 Future Works 
In this research, we focused on TDS attacks injected into the NCS and specialty feedback 
lines where a plant sends output signals to the controller through a communication 
channel. In the future, the effects of TDS attacks on different parts of NCS, such as the 
control signal and referenced signal, will be studied. A TDS attack might cause stability 
and ineffectual issues in NCSs that should be adjusted based on other control systems. 
Delaying the reference signal could cause stability problems for all control systems. 
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A general attack model for NCSs was introduced; however, only TDS attacks were 
studied. Future research will involve studying a combination of attacks such as DoS, TDS 
and FDI attacks. In this case, a primary requisite is the classification of attacks; another 
important requisite is to design a controller to be robust under these combinations of 
attacks. It is believed that the extension of the proposed method will stabilize the NCS 
under a combination of attacks or other types of attacks.  
A method to detect and track TDS attacks on LTI systems was proposed. Additional 
future work will involve the extension of the TDS attack detection method for nonlinear 
systems. Subsequently, a nonlinear system will not need to be linearized, hence, the 
results would be more accurate. 
The last recommendation for future work involves an extension of the proposed protocol 
to reduce and optimize the number of extra communication channels necessary by 
changing the transmission sampling time. This technique allows the controller to obtain 
the necessary information with less delay. Hence, this work needs an optimization 
algorithm to allocate other communication channels and/or change the sampling time of 
the transceiver and receiver with the cost and time savings in mind.   
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